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Development of Electricity Networks: 
Essays on Incentive Regulation and 
the New Role of Consumers 
 
Wenche Birgitta Tobiasson 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The electricity sector is undergoing a remarkable change, supporting the 
overall transition required to meet policy objectives of lower carbon emissions 
as well as a safe and secure supply of electricity in a cost-effective manner for 
consumers. Electricity networks are part of the infrastructure vital to a 
functioning modern economy. This thesis considers specific elements of 
ongoing developments related to electricity networks, namely the changes in 
the economic regulation of networks and the new role for consumer. Achieving 
environmental and climate change policy targets is reliant on electricity 
networks adapting to changes and embracing an increased role in the 
electricity supply chain. The need for sensitivity to social justice and the 
preferences of electricity end-consumers is relatively new to network owners 
but is becoming increasingly important. Four main chapters, employing both 
theoretical and empirical economic methods, quantitative and qualitative, 
explore and advance aspects of incentive regulation and, particularly, the role 
of consumers. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
2017 was the year that energy firmly re-established itself as one of the top 
priorities on the British policy agenda. Whilst Brexit remained the main 
concern, it could be argued that overexposure saturated the media and the 
public’s appetite towards the end of the year, leaving room for other areas of 
focus. In terms of energy specific topics, the Labour Party launched its 
renationalisation plans, the high cost of energy generated a back-and-forth 
between the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) 
and Ofgem (the government regulator for gas and electricity markets in Great 
Britain (GB)) on whose responsibility it was to implement a retail price cap – 
Ofgem stubbornly resisted and the government folded 1  – meanwhile 
electricity networks were making headlines for “above acceptable” returns 
(Citizens Advice, 2017; and The Labour Party, 2017). Nevertheless, most 
citizens day-to-day do not give much thought to efforts required to make 
modern life possible through the power of electricity.  
 
Safe and secure supply of electricity is assumed in developed countries and as 
long as that is delivered, what tend to drive change in the industry are wider 
government policy goals. The GB energy sector is made up of many private 
companies operating in different segments that together make up the system 
required to deliver energy across the county. The plans for privatising the GB 
energy sector was first mentioned in 1981, with an initial focus on oil and gas. 
It was argued that the government should let a competitive market produce 
and consume energy efficiently. British Gas was subsequently privatised in the 
1986, still as a vertically integrated utility, and the early 1990s saw the start of 
electricity industry privatisation (Pearson and Watson, 2012). The 12 regional 
 
1 The cap, now legislated, is due to be implemented in December 2018. 
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electricity boards in England and Wales were the first to be privatised followed 
by the Central Electricity Board, which had been divided into a monopoly 
transmission business (National Grid Company) and two competitive 
generators (National Power and PowerGen). Nuclear generation remained 
under public ownership under the name Nuclear Electric. The Scottish regions 
were also privatised although remained as vertically integrated utilities, that 
is, they retained ownership and control of their transmission networks. 
Various initiatives were introduced during the 1990s to increase competition 
in electricity and in 2000 the competitive segment of retail supply was split 
from the regional distribution networks. Divestment by National Power and 
PowerGen as well as the ‘dash for gas’ saw an increase in competition in 
electricity generation (Pearson and Watson, 2012). 
 
Whilst the Labour Party is pledging to renationalise the energy sector, much 
of the policy focus has moved on and decarbonisation of the industry, as well 
as the economy in more general, is driving the debate. The UK Climate Change 
Act 2008 introduced the world’s first long term legally binding framework to 
tackle climate change. Through the act the UK government set a legally binding 
target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% of 1990 levels by 2050 and 
sets out a framework of how to get there. Being much of the driver behind 
current energy policy and subsequent market changes, it is within the context 
of decarbonisation that this thesis is set.  
 
The introductory chapter is outlined as follows; section 1.2 outlines the thesis 
motivation, including the main challenges facing the electricity network 
utilities. Technological developments, which will ultimately change network 
owner’s operating environments, are summarised. Networks connecting end-
users, distribution network operators (DNOs), are likely to face greater 
challenges, which will require a fundamental change in the relationship 
between utilities and their customers. It is this part of the changing 
relationship and the new role for energy consumers and customers that is 
explored throughout this thesis – an outline of the changing nature of demand 
is provided in section 1.2.2. Section 1.3 outlines a brief summary of economic 
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regulation of electricity networks and section 1.4 provides an overview of the 
theoretical framework, which is applied throughout the thesis. Section 1.5 
describes the outline of the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Thesis motivation 
Electricity is relied upon daily to provide a vast range of amenities. From 
switching a light switch to light our homes or boiling the kettle for a cup of tea 
to running major machinery and construction. Electricity is an integral part of 
modern lives and as such, a safe and reliable supply of electricity is a 
prerequisite for a well-functioning society and benefits the economy in similar 
ways to other infrastructures, such as transportation. In most developed 
countries electricity is reliable with limited interruptions (Joskow, 1998). Few 
people reflect over the efforts that lie behind seemingly simple tasks that are 
required to make many aspects of their lives possible. However, the route from 
electricity generation to safe use in homes and offices is highly complex. 
 
Electricity networks are a crucial part of the power system as they transport 
electricity from generators to end-users. The power grid consists of 
transmission and distribution networks that differ in terms of voltage level, 
size, operation, and objectives. The transmission grid comprises high-voltage 
circuits designed to transfer bulk power from power plants to load centres. 
Following generation, step-up transformers are generally used to raise the 
voltage to a level allowing for efficient long-distance transportation. 
Distribution networks meanwhile deliver electric energy to end-users after 
receiving bulk power from the transmission grid. Substations, where voltage 
levels are reduced, connect circuits between transmission and distribution 
networks. Electricity is delivered to homes and businesses through 
underground cables or overhead lines.  
 
In providing such essential services, the electricity industry is often the subject 
of public debate and highly influenced by government policy and strategic 
objectives. Currently, reducing the human impact on climate change is an area 
of particular importance. The UK government’s green policy agenda include a 
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number of measures with direct impact on the energy sector, such as subsidies 
for renewable generation, ending all generation from unabated coal by 2025, 
and a target of ending the sale of new conventional petrol and diesel cars and 
vans by 2040 (UK government, 2018a). As a result, the government’s measures 
and policies drive changes that impact the whole electricity supply chain along 
technological, social, and economic dimensions, from increased intermittent 
generation, increased demand for charging stations for Electric Vehicles (EVs), 
to smart meters in homes, which enable more active electricity consumers. 
Electricity networks, and particularly distribution networks by being the point 
that physically connects consumers to the system, face a number of challenges 
going forward. A smarter electricity system will cause distribution networks, 
which were originally designed as passive transporters of electric energy, to 
face a shift in their operational model in terms of bi-directional power flows 
and use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). Moreover, 
penetration of Distributed Generation (DG) sources, EVs, and storage facilities 
create techno-economic challenges that require grid upgrade, reinforcement, 
technological improvement, and, possibly, the development of new business 
models (Poudineh and Jamasb, 2014; ENA, 2017). Furthermore, with 
increased focus on consumer involvement, both in terms of active 
participation in the market and revenue recovery, as illustrated by, for 
example, the ENAs Open Networks Project (ENA, 2017), the DNOs will be 
required to develop methods to allow for demand response, smart metering, 
and consumer involvement in planning and operation of the networks. 
 
1.2.1 New technologies – Game changers 
Distributed energy resources 
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) are facilities that can generate 
electricity (and heat) using several small- and medium-scale technologies. 
These include different types of DG such as small turbines, fuel cells, Combined 
Heat and Power (CHP), and photovoltaic systems (IEA, 2002). These facilities 
either connect to the distribution network or serve customers directly on-site. 
This differs from the traditional system, which produces electricity in a few 
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large facilities that is then transported over long distances through 
transmission and distribution networks to reach consumers. 
 
DERs have several possible benefits. A greater number of local generation 
facilities can potentially reduce congestion in the network and defer upgrades 
to transmission and distribution systems. Additionally, quality of supply can 
increase as energy is generated closer to demand, and system losses may also 
decrease (IEA, 2002). DG currently accounts for a small proportion of total 
capacity, but this share is set to increase as these technologies improve. 
Furthermore, growing concerns over climate change, constraints in upgrading 
the transmission grid, and supply security are increasing the number of 
generators connected to distribution networks (IEA, 2002). 
 
However, large volumes of DG can affect the quality of supply, voltage levels, 
and phase imbalance (Putrus et al., 2009), whilst large increases in renewable 
sources can create new bottlenecks in distribution networks. In passive 
networks, the DG capacity that can be connected is limited as network stability 
is essential for a safe and secure supply, and large volumes of DG may cause 
system volatility (Lopes et al., 2007). The GB Electricity System Operator (SO), 
National Grid, is working to alleviate operational challenges caused by, for the 
SO, essentially hidden (“behind the meter”) generation capacity as well as the 
increase in non-synchronous renewable generation. Due to the rise of DG, GB 
grid minimum demand is falling, as is overall demand (although this may be 
reversed following increased uptake in EVs (National Grid, 2018b)). 7 out of 
the 10 lowest demand periods ever recorded in GB were in 2017. The other 3 
were in 2016. Moreover, due to the large proportion of installed solar capacity, 
the grid minimum demand now sometimes occurs during daytime, a new 
phenomenon that represents an operational challenge for the SO (National 
Grid, 2018a). The cost of balancing the system is therefore increasing and 
becoming more volatile (Ofgem, 2017). 
 
Alongside the increased focus on DG is the prospect of development of storage 
technologies. Depending on the duration of storage, benefits include voltage 
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and frequency control (short storage), peak load topping, renewable power 
smoothing (medium storage), smoothing of weather effects, and annual 
smoothing of loads (long storage). Thus, energy storage can increase the 
penetration of DG by ensuring a smoother supply and offering greater demand 
predictability (Barton and Infield, 2004).  
 
The smart information and communication technology era:  
Smart grids and meters 
Conventional distribution networks are passive and operate based on 
predefined values and are thus unable to respond to short-term customer 
behaviour. They are also unable to accommodate the wide range of renewable 
and DERs. Therefore, large increases in DG and EV necessitate the 
development of active networks with the ability to respond to changes in 
demand and supply. A smart grid uses ICTs to collect and respond to 
information about customer and supplier behaviour. With two-way 
communication technologies and smart meters, the networks can better 
respond to changes in demand, aggregate consumption, and grid condition, 
enabling informed participation by their customers (Byun et al., 2011). 
 
However, the implementation of smart technology does not automatically lead 
to smart network operation. The transition must be comprehensive and 
requires retraining of staff as well as development and implementation of new 
protocols that are compatible with the new operating environment (Arends 
and Hendriks, 2014). Moreover, the costs associated with active smart 
networks are substantial, and their benefits need to justify and outweigh their 
costs. In the conventional business model, DNOs do not normally have an 
incentive to implement a responsive grid as these would only be able to offer 
limited immediate benefits to the network operators (Lopes et al., 2007). By 
2020, the UK government wants every home in England, Wales, and Scotland 
to be offered a smart meter. The national rollout has to date installed about 
nine million smart meters in homes and businesses (BEIS, 2017). Although a 
smarter electricity system can benefit network operators, with access to real-
time data, end-users have the potential to control their consumption, which, 
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without sufficient operational and technological advancement, may increase 
volatility on the system.  
 
Electric vehicles 
The UK government has implemented a number of measures to incentivise the 
public to switch from traditional vehicles, which run on petrol or diesel, to EVs. 
These measures include grants, road tax waivers, and exemption from London 
congestion charges (TRL, 2013). Most recently, the UK government committed 
to ending the sale of new conventional petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2040 
(UK government, 2018a). In 2014, only 5% of consumers were considering 
buying an electric car or van in the near future (Department for Transport, 
2014) and although new registrations of EVs have been increasing since then, 
they still only account for 1.7% of all new vehicle registrations (UK 
government, 2018b). On the other hand, strong incentives in countries such as 
Norway have resulted in a greater demand for electric cars. A recent study by 
Regen (2018) finds that high up-front costs as well as range and charging 
anxiety are current barriers to high consumer updates. It is therefore possible 
that financial incentives and technological progress can increase the uptake of 
EVs in the UK (Putrus et al., 2009). 
 
Electric vehicles have yet to make a substantial impact on the distribution 
network; however, since the vehicles use batteries with large storage capacity, 
allowing them to travel longer distances, an upsurge in uptake may place 
strain on the network. One potential problem relates to a mismatch of supply 
and demand due to uncertainties regarding when and how owners charge 
their vehicles. The distribution grids can only safely carry up to a certain load, 
and if owners charge their vehicles at peak demand hours, a congested 
network may overload. Therefore, substantial local infrastructural 
reinforcements are required to accommodate the integration of EVs (Lopes et 
al., 2011). Alternatively, a portfolio of charging options, for example workplace 
of destination charging, may help spread the demand load both geographically 
and over time (Regen, 2018). DNOs are currently consulting on a proposal to 
let network operators control EV charging to manage potential overload 
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events. This is argued to be an interim solution to protect local electricity 
network assets in the absence of market-led solutions (SSEN, 2018). 
 
As the number of vehicles increases, the DNOs will need to upgrade the 
network to supply the charging points and other required infrastructure 
(Pieltain Fernández et al., 2011). However, provided that the necessary 
infrastructure is in place, the vehicles may be able to deliver electricity back to 
the grid. This opens the possibility for electric cars to provide peak-demand 
relief, which would reduce the need for grid capacity enhancement. 
Additionally, the potential mismatch between demand and supply can be 
eliminated through improved communication and provision of price 
incentives to consumers to encourage off-peak, or smart, charging 
arrangements (Putrus et al., 2009). These changes in the operating 
environment of distribution networks will necessitate a shift in the operating 
philosophy of these companies from being Distribution Network Operators 
(DNOs) to Distribution System Operators (DSOs). This shift is the current 
subject of an industry wide project led by the ENA; the Open Network Project 
(ENA, 2017). 
 
1.2.2 The consumer and society: The changing nature of demand 
Governments across Europe have set ambitious green energy targets to curb 
emissions. The policies, including increased generation of renewable energy 
and EV expansion, largely depend on public and local support for their success. 
The role of the individual and the community in energy policy issues is thus on 
the rise (Akcura et al., 2011). This trend is also noticeable in the transportation 
of electricity. The technical challenges of electricity networks, particularly 
DNOs, to ensure a sustainable energy future include extensive expansion and 
modernisation of the networks to allow for smaller but more numerous 
generation facilities, uptake of EVs, and active grid management. However, 
whilst the technical and economic aspects receive more attention from the 
sector and academics alike, they are only part of the challenge. As the nature 
of electricity demand and supply is changing, so is the role of the society and 
consumer engagement in the sector. 
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Societal and consumer acceptance of green energy innovations play an 
important part in addressing and curbing climate change. Whilst it is generally 
thought that public attitudes towards renewable energy are positive, local 
opposition to large facilities remains significant. The importance of public 
acceptance has been discussed with regards to large infrastructural projects, 
such as transmission lines (Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013), renewable-energy-
generation technologies (Devine-Wright, 2011), and hazardous facilities 
(Johnson and Scicchitano, 2012). However, where large infrastructure, put 
simply, only needs “passive” consent (see Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013), DG, 
EVs, and smart networks depend on “active” acceptance from consumers. This 
includes the willingness to invest, install, and change behaviour to adapt to 
these new technologies (Sauter and Watson, 2007). The slow progress from 
simple acceptance to participation and changing behaviour shows how 
priorities expressed by citizens, e.g. supporting green economy agenda, 
sometimes fail to translate into actions by customers, e.g. purchasing an EV 
(Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2012). 
 
The shift to a decentralised generation mix creates a flow of electricity that is 
less predictable and, at least initially, less controllable. Shifts in both demand 
and supply will have an effect on the operation of DNOs. Through increased 
uptake of demand–response, smart grids, and DG, customers are more 
involved and can actively contribute to increased energy efficiency, energy 
saving, and peak load shifts. Not only are customers able to influence the 
demand side through altering their electricity consumption patterns, but also 
on the supply side, where consumers can take on the role of producer through 
distributed generation, the so-called prosumers (Mah et al., 2012). 
 
Moreover, customer action is the main driver behind reaching the policy goals 
to curb climate change, and consumer engagement should therefore be a 
priority (Honebein et al., 2011). Smart grids and DG require communication 
between utility companies and its customers. The relationship is likely to 
change from a one-way information flow to a two-way interactive discussion. 
However, not only will network owners be required to engage actively with 
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customers once new technologies are implemented, through dialogue at an 
early stage, but they can also learn about their customers’ priorities and 
concerns and adapt these technologies accordingly. Early communication and 
customer participation are important for building trust and confidence among 
consumers, which in turn is important for achieving customer acceptance of 
new technologies (Gangale et al., 2013).  
 
Ultimately, increasing communication and participation with customers will 
bring to light the heterogeneity of customer behaviour, as the same technology 
may be perceived differently among different groups in the same or different 
communities (Batel and Devine-Wright, 2014). The role of the consumer in the 
sector is shifting. As distribution networks change from passive to active 
utilities, the public is changing from being a passive to an active stakeholder. 
Similarly, on a bigger scale, with energy policy driving a need for an expansion 
of the electricity network, society is becoming more active in the development 
process. This changing nature of demand, increased customer and public 
engagement, acts as a common thread throughout the thesis.  
 
1.3 Economic regulation of networks 
Electricity networks are capital intensive, creating high economies of scale and 
therefore high barriers to new entry. As a result, the network segment of the 
electricity system is considered as natural monopolies. Due to the non-
competitive nature, electricity networks are subject to regulation to prevent 
monopoly pricing, discriminatory access to network services and ensure 
sufficient maintenance for an efficient level of supply (Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2001; Newbery, 2002).  
 
Performance of networks is important since the transportation of electricity 
represent a significant cost of end-consumers final energy costs. It is also the 
platform for competitive segments of the electricity system, wholesale and 
retail markets, and therefore affects the performance of the whole sector. 
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There are many different models applied in the regulation of natural 
monopolies. The individual regulators’ knowledge about operations, ability to 
monitor, and administrative burden of governance will all influence the choice 
of model. However, due to information asymmetries between the regulator 
and the regulated companies, traditional command and control models, which 
are heavy-handed with detailed instructions on specific technologies, assets, 
or procedures, have given way for incentive-based frameworks that are less 
prescriptive. 
 
1.3.1 A new regulatory environment– drivers behind change 
Investment and innovation 
The post-liberalisation policies of achieving a low-carbon economy have 
changed the dynamics of the electricity sector. This is reflected in the need for 
smart technologies, DERs, EVs, network security, and integration of electricity 
markets. Achieving these objectives calls for substantial innovation and 
investments. Ensuring sufficient and efficient investments in the networks is 
among the most challenging tasks facing regulators (Poudineh and Jamasb, 
2015). 
 
The current regulatory models of investment treatment are either ex ante (e.g. 
Ofgem), ex post, or a combination of the two (e.g. the Norwegian regulator, 
NVE). Under the ex ante model, network companies need to submit business 
plans that contain details of their investment needs over the subsequent 
regulatory period. The regulator uses auditing, cost–benefit analysis, 
benchmarking, and consultants to verify the prudence of investments plans. At 
the end of the regulatory period, if there is a deviation from the agreed level of 
capital expenditures in the business plan, the regulator might partially or 
totally disallow the excess investment (Ofgem, 2010a; Ofgem, 2010b). 
 
The ex ante approach has been criticised on the grounds that it provides 
incentive for strategic behaviour. For example, network companies will have 
incentive to inflate their capital costs by reporting high volumes of work or by 
capitalising their operational expenditures. Averch and Johnson (1967) 
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demonstrated that under this model firms will, for a given level of output, 
employ more capital compared to non-regulated companies. 
 
In ex post regulation, the regulator adds the controllable costs incurred to the 
company, including the operating and capital expenditures, in order to 
construct a single variable reflecting the total cost. The total cost is then 
benchmarked against the similar companies in the sector to obtain the cost 
efficiency. The firms’ revenue is set based on their deviation from the frontier 
of best performance. The threat of financial loss from the benchmarking 
process can lead to an inefficient level of operating and capital expenditure. 
Poudineh and Jamasb (2015) showed that this model is vulnerable to 
harmonised behaviours, such as over- and under-investment by utilities. 
Harmonised behaviour changes the costs for companies uniformly, and 
within-group comparisons cannot detect the incidence of overcapitalisation. 
Additionally, the minimum productivity level to pass a benchmarking exercise 
(that is, no-impact efficiency) is also vulnerable to harmonised behaviour.  
 
Regulatory treatment of investment presents a trade-off between intervention 
in firms’ operation and distribution of risk between the firms and their 
consumers. The ex ante model is more interventionist, but the firm bears little 
risk compared to the consumers. This is because consumers are more likely to 
be exposed to the actual costs of the firm rather than the efficient costs. The ex 
post model, on the other hand, is less interventionist, but firms bear more risk 
compared to consumers. The choice between the two approaches depends on 
the regulator’s view of intervention and risk. 
 
As noted by Müller et al. (2010), under incentive regimes (both ex ante and ex 
post), efficiency gain has mainly been achieved in operating costs, but 
regulatory models do not incentivise dynamic, efficient behaviour among 
firms. In the case of ex post regulatory treatment of investment, Poudineh et al. 
(2014) show that persistent inefficiency due to the presence of quasi-fixed 
inputs, such as capital, can affect companies’ short-run cost efficiency and 
regulated revenue. This can create disincentives for long-term investment and 
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innovation. In the case of ex ante regulation, although capital costs are 
excluded from benchmarking, the model does not provide explicit incentives 
for dynamically efficient behaviour. 
 
Incentives and alignment of benefits 
In order to unlock the system-wide benefits of dynamic networks that will be 
able to respond to demand and supply signals, the incentives that guide the 
behaviour of players need to be realigned. Additionally, policies need to serve 
the diverse interests of distributed resource developers and consumers. The 
public, as well as community engagement with the sector as consumers and as 
citizens, can affect the development of the network and energy infrastructures. 
Some projects have stood still because local communities perceive them as 
failing to meet their objectives (Tobiasson et al., 2016). The need for 
involvement of customers in the planning of new projects or through demand-
side participation requires a new consumer–network utility framework and 
relationship. 
 
Consumers with micro-generation, EV, and storage capability are no longer 
passive users, but can actively benefit or harm the system. The load from EV 
varies with respect to time and location. In the absence of incentives, the EV 
owner indifferently charges and discharges at any time and place. However, 
the power system would benefit from charging during off-peak periods and in 
uncongested areas and discharging at peak times and in congested zones. 
Thus, there is a need for incentive signals that coordinate the actions of players 
to the advantage of power system reliability and efficiency. However, current 
regulatory models do not provide such incentives and thus are contrary to the 
paradigm of a sustainable power sector (ENA, 2017; Aurora Energy Research, 
2018). 
 
The current incentives for the integration of DERs are not directly relevant in 
terms of impact on network infrastructure and generation supply. For 
example, siting a DG close to demand centres or areas served by frequently 
congested lines will be beneficial for a DNO as it can reduce network energy 
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losses and have an impact on demand-driven investments. DG can have 
various effects on the grid, depending on factors such as location, technological 
specification, and timing of investments (Vogel, 2009). The lack of a 
mechanism that aligns these benefits between the DG developer and the DNO 
might reverse the expected advantages of DG integration. 
 
An example of this is network energy losses. Networks are incentivised to 
reduce such losses and are rewarded or penalised for outperforming or 
underperforming on the loss targets. Although DG can reduce these losses, it 
is generally bound by time and location and, in the case that capacity exceeds 
the demand, it can increase overall energy losses (Harrison et al., 2007). 
Therefore, DNOs might be exposed to DG-induced losses, with consequences 
for their revenue. On the other hand, generators are not incentivised for their 
positive or negative effect on network energy losses. Hence, there is a conflict 
between the interest of developers wishing to increase DG penetration and the 
DNO that wants to avoid potential DG-induced losses. 
 
One solution is to use efficient and effective connection and “Use of System” 
(UoS) charges—a mechanism that not only includes the real cost of connection 
but also rewards the developer when DG installation is in line with the optimal 
operation of the network (Jamasb et al., 2005). The distribution UoS charges 
can play a role, as DGs’ connection charges could be based on their capacity 
and the sole-use network asset used. On the other hand, rewards can be 
offered based on generator-exported power at system peak, proximity to 
frequently congested zones, and network assets utilised (Nelson et al., 2014; 
Poudineh and Jamasb, 2014). This ensures that rewards will reflect the 
benefits from integration of the resource. Taking into account the cost drivers 
when devising the charges and rewards will help to guarantee that they are 
aligned with the costs imposed by DGs on the network.  
 
Managing uncertainties  
There are several sources of uncertainty in the operating environment of 
distribution network companies, which call for uncertainty to be incorporated 
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into regulatory models. These include future strengthening of environmental 
policies, change in price of fossil fuels and its effect on the rate of growth of 
renewable resources, cost and performance of networks, carbon prices, 
uncertain demand and economic growth, availability of capital, and finally, 
change in the behaviour and expectations of consumers.  
 
Electricity networks face significant uncertainty from unexpected changes in 
the aforementioned factors. These factors can impact the existing 
infrastructures in terms of planning and operation, as well as development of 
new assets. The network infrastructures are long-lived assets and irreversible 
investments. Hence, insufficient consideration of uncertainty in the regulatory 
and decision-making process can lead to negative consequences for the firm 
and consumers. The regulatory framework should also recognise the 
increasing importance of local communities as part of the low-carbon solution, 
and provide incentives for these communities to become part of the solution 
for future networks. 
 
Thus, given the prominence of uncertainty, there is a need for regulatory 
models that reduce the exposure of firms and society to the adverse effects of 
changes in the operating environments of network companies (MIT, 2016). 
Furthermore, investors, who are interested in a stable return on their 
investments, do not welcome uncertainty. Uncertainty means risk, which is 
likely to erode creditworthiness of the utilities and manifest in the form of 
higher capital costs and thus higher bills for consumers. This will lead to 
reduction of capital availability, which affects network companies’ future 
investment plans. 
 
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
 
1.4.1 New Institutional Economics 
Traditional neoclassical economic theories rely heavily on assumptions of 
perfect information, costless transactions and rationality. In the assessment of 
the energy sector, and electricity networks in particular, which include many 
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practical issues, these are therefore of limited relevance (Wawer, 2007; Coase, 
2000; Kumkar, 1998). Classic economic theories consider commodities, labour 
and consumers as the smallest units in the analysis of the relation between the 
individual and forces of nature. This allows the economists to study how 
supply and demand determine prices but not the factors that determine what 
goods and services are traded on markets and therefore are priced. New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) considers the activity between actors and the 
norms governing them (i.e. transactions) as the smallest unit because these 
must be negotiated before any level of production, exchange and consumption 
can occur (Commons, 1931). 
 
As such, NIE offers an alternative method of enquiry compared to the more 
orthodox theories. NIE accepts the assumptions of profit maximisation and 
efficiency but rejects those of zero transaction costs, rationality and perfect 
information. Institutions refer to the rules of an economy such as formal rules 
(e.g., written rules of contractual agreements, constitutions and laws) and 
informal constraints (e.g., unwritten codes of conduct, social norms of 
behaviour and beliefs). Organisations (i.e. a group of actors bound together by 
a common purpose to achieve common objectives) on the other hand are 
considered as the players in the economy. Actors form institutions to reduce 
transaction costs and uncertainty as they facilitate transactions and 
cooperative behaviour (North, 1990). 
 
Williamson (1979) argues that transaction costs depend on asset specificity, 
uncertainty, opportunism, bounded rationality and frequency of transactions. 
Specificity is highlighted as the most important aspect among these and may 
appear in the form of site, physical asset or human asset specificity 
(Williamson, 1981). 
 
Electricity networks have characteristics of site specificity, physical asset 
specificity and human asset specificity, making interactions and cooperation 
prone to high transaction costs. For example, as will be illustrated in Chapter 
4 and 5, reaching unanimous decisions in large transmission developments is 
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difficult due to two main characteristics. First, the size of projects, including 
physical, financial, and number of stakeholders, makes negotiation and 
bargaining difficult as the involved parties have different objectives and stakes 
in the project. Second, many decisions involve public goods which are difficult 
to quantify and therefore risks being exploited. These characteristics lead to 
uncertainty, undefined and therefore unsuccessful principal-agent 
relationships, as well as information asymmetries. In turn, this generates 
increased transaction costs, externalities, and subsequent market failure. 
 
The central concepts of NIE, namely transaction cost theory, property rights 
theory, and agency theory, are applied throughout the thesis, with particular 
focus on the new consumer role. 
 
1.5 Thesis outline 
Consisting of four main chapters, the thesis uses theoretical and applied 
economic methods, both qualitative and quantitative, to explore and advance 
aspects of economic regulation, focusing on incentive regulation, and the new 
role of consumers in the ongoing development of electricity networks. 
 
Chapter 2 considers current policy-driven changes and the impact on the 
consumer role within incentive regulation. It is a qualitative assessment with 
particular focus on electricity distribution networks. Forming a critical part of 
the electricity supply chain, electricity networks are facing challenges across 
technological, social, and economic dimensions, requiring a change in how 
networks are operated. In response to this, Ofgem, the GB regulator, is 
adapting its regulatory framework by introducing greater reliance on 
customer engagement and targeted incentive schemes providing outputs 
beyond those focusing on efficiency improvements. We present a critical 
comparison of the treatment of consumers in traditional input-based 
approaches and the new output-based incentive framework, using the GB 
framework as an example. 
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Chapter 3 is a quantitative empirical assessment of incentive regulation using 
data from Norwegian distribution owners. If applied correctly, productivity 
analysis and benchmarking can be an effective way of reducing informational 
asymmetry between regulated utilities and the regulator. We apply a 
stochastic frontier analysis approach to study the impact of ownership 
structure and vertical integration between network levels on utilities’ cost 
efficiency. These are two previously overlooked aspects when assessing 
electricity distribution companies’ efficiency. Policy drivers behind initiatives 
to encourage certain ownership structures or unbundling within the energy 
sector are often based on assumptions of efficiency improvements, yet not 
always validated. We will therefore assess the impact of ownership structure 
and vertical integration between different network levels (i.e. the same 
company owns both transmission and distribution assets) on companies’ 
social total cost efficiency using data from Norwegian DNOs. 
 
Chapter 4 applies the theoretical framework outlined in section 1.4 and the 
challenges outlined in section 1.3 for a critical qualitative assessment of large-
scale network developments and the resolution of social conflict. Increasingly, 
local opposition to new electricity grid projects cause lengthy delays and 
places financial and practical strain on the projects. Whilst the structure of the 
electricity industry is in transition due to the emergence of smaller but more 
numerous generation facilities and wider society and local communities 
increasingly engage with energy and environmental issues, the traditional 
decision-making frameworks and processes remain the same. The chapter 
proposes an economic approach to resolve conflicts that may arise. We discuss 
how compensation, benefit sharing, and property rights can have a role in 
reducing community opposition to grid development. However, we argue that 
these methods need to be part of an overarching policy towards conflict 
resolution in grid development. We then propose that such impacts can be 
addressed within a ‘weak’ versus ‘strong’ sustainability framework. We 
suggest that the concepts of ‘collective negotiation’ and ‘menu of options’ in 
regulatory economics can be adapted to operationalise the suggested 
sustainability-based approach to arrive at more efficient and socially desirable 
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outcomes. The proposed framework can lead to the identification of socially 
acceptable outcomes that could otherwise have gone undetected. 
 
In Chapter 5 we look at the practical impact of ambitious renewable energy 
targets and an aging infrastructure, which necessitate a substantial upgrading 
and expansion of the electricity networks, in a case study. Although vital for 
the functioning of the economy and a green energy future, grid development 
projects are often met by public opposition, which increase costs and lead to 
lengthy planning processes. Therefore, understanding the social aspects of a 
green energy economy is becoming increasingly important. We analyse these 
issues from a New Institutional Economic perspective, outlining the economic 
characteristics of transmission developments and public engagement. We 
identify previously overlooked features of the planning process that 
contribute to the rise in conflicts, public opposition and prolonged project 
realisation. The Scottish Beauly–Denny high voltage transmission 
development is discussed in detail and our findings indicate a need for better 
engagement with local communities at an earlier stage of planning. Trust 
between communities, developers and government is important for the 
negotiations and can be achieved through transparency, specific education 
and set guidelines for stakeholder engagement in the planning process. 
 
Finally, chapter 6 concludes and proposes avenues for further research.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Incentive Regulation and the New Role for Consumers 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Maintaining a well-functioning liberalised sector requires supervision and 
regulation of the wholesale and retail markets as well as the networks services. 
At grid level, this becomes more important as there is currently limited 
competition and the GB network owners are subject to incentive-based 
regulation. The incentive regulation regimes aim to stimulate market 
outcomes in this segment of the sector and the expectation is that incentive 
regulation better realises the objectives of regulators compared to rate-of-
return models. Commonly regulatory models focus on incentivising firms to 
minimise its inputs, namely its costs, whilst delivering a required set of 
outputs.  
 
Traditional network outputs are determined by demand for energy and 
network connections, which is exogenous for firms (meaning that they have 
little control over these, at least in the short run) and firms are therefore only 
able to adjust their inputs to deliver its services efficiently. The input-focused 
approach has generally been successful in improving technical and economic 
efficiency; however, the post-liberalisation experience has shown that 
incentive regimes give rise to new challenges, including those related to 
investments and innovation. Additionally, promotion of low-carbon 
technologies and objectives, as well as a more active customer base, has 
resulted in new challenges that require regulatory innovation and solutions. 
The changing energy landscape is driving a change in regulatory efforts, 
including the introduction of additional incentives and a move to output-based 
methods, where regulated firms’ revenue is not only determined by its 
efficient use of inputs but also how well it is delivering set targets, outputs and 
outcomes. The new network outputs go beyond the exogenous outputs of 
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energy delivered or connections and focus on quality of supply, environmental 
targets, and customer satisfaction. One prominent example is the GB regulator, 
Ofgem, which has adapted its regulatory framework in an attempt to better 
facilitate the current energy and environmental transition by introducing 
greater reliance on customer engagement and targeted incentive schemes 
beyond those focusing on efficiency improvements. The broad nature of the 
challenges, across the energy sector, shows a need for whole system 
consideration at each step. Specific issues and solutions cannot be viewed in 
isolation and whilst the energy system is becoming more decentralised, 
thinking must be joined up at all levels. 
 
In this chapter, using qualitative analysis, we provide a critical comparison of 
input and output-based incentive regulation, using the GB electricity networks 
as an example, with particular focus on the treatment of consumers and 
consumer engagement. Policy objectives are driving intensified public interest 
in environmental issues and the electricity sector is currently undergoing 
changes that are making energy companies’ actions more visible and 
consumers more active. Consumer engagement is a relatively new concept to 
electricity networks but it is becoming increasingly important in order to keep 
up with the rapid changes. Regulatory changes are notoriously slow and can, 
given the high degree of regulation of networks, which includes revenue 
control, act as a barrier for networks to follow progress in the sector. This risks 
delaying the realisation of policy targets.  
 
The chapter is outlined as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of 
incentive regulation, focusing on the more traditional input-based approach, 
including theoretical underpinnings, practical examples and the treatment of 
consumers. Section 2.3 outlines the new output-based framework, using the 
GB frameworks as an example. Section 2.4 compares and contrast the role of 
consumers in the two approaches and section 2.5 concludes. 
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2.2 Incentive regulation 
Electricity networks are regulated to ensure sufficient supply at fair prices for 
consumers, however charges must also be set to assure that the regulated 
firms secure sufficient revenue from their investments to maintain the grid. A 
traditional form of regulation is rate-of-return regulation, which lets firms 
cover its operating and capital costs plus a return on capital. This method is 
however criticised due to its lack of incentive for firms to increase efficiency 
and reduce costs. Sectorial reforms and regulators across Europe have 
therefore focused on an alternative form of regulation, namely incentive 
regulation. It is used to provide firms with incentives to become more efficient 
and increase investments, and to make sure that the costumers benefit from 
the cost reductions.  
 
Using rewards and penalties to incentivise network utilities to achieve certain 
goals or motivate certain performance can partly overcome one of the main 
issues of regulation, namely information asymmetry between the regulator 
and the regulated firms. The approach of the firms to achieve the set goals of 
performance measures is up to the firms themselves, providing the 
opportunity to utilise internal information to improve performance. 
 
Two issues arise from asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Joskow, 2008). Adverse selection arises when a firm is perceived to 
have higher costs than it actually does in order for the regulator set higher 
prices. Moral hazard arises because the regulator is unable to know the 
managerial efforts of the firm. By increasing information availability and 
quality, the regulator can reduce its informational disadvantage. 
 
The most commonly applied incentive regulatory models are price cap, 
revenue cap, and yardstick regulation (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007).  
 
Price and revenue caps are based on the same underlying theory where the 
cap is adjusted to an index that reflects the rate of inflation in the economy. 
This is to provide an incentive similar to firms in competitive markets, which 
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are subject to input prices increasing with inflation. It provides the 
opportunity to regulated businesses to increase efficiency relative to average 
firms by reducing its costs or improving performance thus outperforming 
inflation. 
 
Yardstick regulation encourages firms to cut cost and become more efficient 
by comparing performance to a reference point or frontier, set by either 
comparing performance among firms (also called benchmarking) or using an 
optimal reference firm. Identifying the appropriate yardstick depends on data 
and technical availability of the regulator and may therefore not be 
appropriate in some situations.   
 
It is common practice that regulators utilise a hybrid of different regulatory 
methods. A widely used method based on the price or revenue cap model is 
RPI – X, where the price adjusts for the retail price index in the previous year 
and an expected efficiency improvement – the X-factor. The method was first 
implemented by Ofgem in GB but has since been replicated in many countries.  
However, one of the issues facing regulators is how to appoint the appropriate 
requirements for efficiency, i.e., the X-factor. It is therefore common to apply 
benchmarking as a method to distinguishing a firm’s actual performance to 
enable a comparison of its relative efficiency against a reference point or 
benchmark performance. Poorly performing firms will be assigned greater X – 
factors to give them the incentive to reduce the gap between themselves and 
the most efficient firms (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003). Benchmarking is argued to 
be cost effective and advantageous when regulating individual or numerous 
utilities, domestically or across borders. Generating the X-factors using 
external measures increases the firms’ incentive to become more efficient and 
improve information transparency since the reliance on the firms’ own cost 
information is decreased (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001; Joskow, 2007).  
 
The Norwegian energy regulator, NVE, utilises an incentive-based revenue-
cap regulatory framework to encourage network companies to reduce costs 
and improve efficiency. The allowed revenue is set using total cost 
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benchmarking of comparable firms and the revenue cap is determined using a 
share of firms’ actual cost and the benchmarked norm cost. The incentive 
power of regulation and stimulated competition among utilities to improve 
cost efficiency is achieved by placing a higher weight on the norm cost. That is, 
by putting a higher weight on the norm cost, the regulator is incentivising 
firms to move closer to the frontier of best-performance. 
 
2.2.1 Incentive regulation and the treatment of consumers 
Regulators objectives with regards to network regulation have traditionally 
focused on protecting customers from monopoly pricing by monopoly 
network owners. Ofgem state its principal objective as “protecting the interests 
of existing and future electricity and gas consumers”. Without extensive 
detailed knowledge of the customer base and its priorities assumptions must 
be made of what this actually entails. Based on basic economic theory of 
rationality of agents it is fair to assume that cost minimisation for a given level 
of service is a priority. This is also the approach of most regulators 
incentivising firms to optimise their inputs (i.e. costs) to achieve a certain level 
of outputs exogenously set by demand.  
 
The driving forces behind privatisation of the energy sector in the UK was the 
prevailing market conditions, which in included spiralling inflation rates and 
unemployment. There was also a political shift regarding state involvement in 
economic activity and ownership of industry. Prioritising efficiency 
improvements was therefore necessary and the main aim of the regulator, 
acting in line with general government policy of the time. Direct engagement 
between customers and network owners or regulators in the post-liberalised 
era has therefore been limited. 20-30 years on we have seen efficiency 
improvements in the operation of electricity networks, however, regulation 
will have to change to meet the challenges, such as technological development 
and demands from electricity consumers and producers (Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2007). 
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Following concerns that cost-minimisation incentives was having an adverse 
effect on quality of service of networks, many regulators have opted to include 
a measure of service quality in their regulatory models (Giannakis et al., 2005). 
This can be considered as a first step towards a more output-based framework, 
aimed at increasing customer focus although, as we will see, not necessary 
customer participation, in the regulatory process.  
 
Economic theory suggests that the level of quality should represent customers’ 
valuation and the marginal cost of quality improvements. Ideally, customers 
should be given a choice of quality and charged according to the cost of 
providing it. However, offering different levels of quality depending on 
willingness to pay for it may be politically sensitive given the equality aspects 
of the possibility that those with more money can enjoy a more reliable 
electricity supply (Waddams Price et al. 2002).  
 
In 2001 NVE introduced a quality variable in its calculation of network 
companies’ revenue caps. The variable uses interruptions to supply, estimates 
of energy not supplied and an average interruption cost for different customer 
groups. The estimated cost of interruptions for customer groups is calculated 
by the regulator based on responses to customer surveys. Similarly, the 
Finnish regulator uses cost estimation surveys as a basis for its quality of 
supply incentive, with regular updates to ensure that the values applied in the 
regulatory model are still valid (CEER, 2016a). 
 
Many countries across Europe have implemented reward and penalty schemes 
or incentives to optimise quality of supply levels in its electricity networks. 
However, the estimation of the price of quality is not always achieved through 
identifying customer willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept, as in 
Norway and Finland, discussed above. For example, when Sweden introduced 
a quality indicator in its regulatory framework in 2012, the regulator Ei opted 
to employ customer group specific cost norms, identified through a general 
assessment of available cost of interruptions information, rather than a 
customer specific survey (Ei, 2010). Moreover, in 2009, Ofgem extended its 
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RPI-X model to include a quality indicator without conducting cost or optimal 
quality level surveys with GB customers (CEER, 2016a). 
 
Generally, electricity customers have had a limited role in the regulation of 
electricity networks. However, the concept of customer engagement is on the 
rise and play a central role in a number of regulatory jurisdictions in North 
America where negotiated settlements has emerged over time. Negotiated 
settlements between companies and their customers have been found to 
reduce costs and uncertainty, whilst limiting regulatory burden (Littlechild, 
2016). 
 
2.3 A new approach to incentive regulation: an output-based 
framework 
Following liberalisation, the main concern of network regulation was ensuring 
security and reliability, which was provided by engineering, health and safety 
requirements. Incentive regulation has generally been successful in improving 
technical and economic efficiency and traditionally, regulators have used an 
input-based approach where firms are rewarded for cost-minimisation. 
However, network long-term sustainability and innovation concerns are often 
overseen in the input-based framework, thus the innovations in incentive 
regulation of quality of service have lagged that of cost efficiency schemes 
(Growitsch et al., 2005; Giannakis et al., 2005). The intention of increasing 
customer focus in the regulatory framework is not always associated with 
increased direct customer or consumer engagement, meaning that the 
customer role remains much the same. However, 30 or so years later, the 
energy sector is undergoing a remarkable change, particularly noticeable in 
distribution networks. As the go-between connecting transmission and 
customers, distribution networks are expected to play an important role in 
reaching a sustainable energy future. The services that DNOs are required to 
deliver are increasing; DNOs are expected to engage with customers, through 
demand response and stakeholder engagement, allow for an increased uptake 
of EVs and DG, whilst ensuring a safe and reliable service at fair prices for 
customers. A combination of challenges, including increased reliance on 
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renewable energy, DG, aging infrastructure, and increased concern of utilities’ 
social and environmental impact, is expected to render the traditional DNO 
business model out-dated (Lehr, 2013). In other words, the days of passive 
transporters of electricity are over.  
 
As a result of the changing nature of DNOs, GB regulator Ofgem have adapted 
a new regulatory framework, which puts an emphasis on long-term 
sustainability through increased focus on expected deliverables. The new 
regulatory scheme, RIIO (Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs), is an 
example where a wider set of incentives focus on output measures of 
companies’ performance, rather than merely cost-minimisation. RIIO aims to 
promote greater benefits for customers and stronger incentives for utilities to 
deliver a sustainable energy sector for current and future generations (Ofgem, 
2010a).  
 
The move to output-based regulation signals an increase in the demands and 
expectations of network owners. It reflects the shift in the industry from one 
which is concerned mainly with technical matters to one which increasingly 
involves social, political, and environmental aspects. In order to meet the 
future challenges, network owners must take on a more active role, engage in 
stakeholder discussion, respond to instant changes in demand and supply, 
increase customer service, as well as focus on environmental concerns and 
equality. In order to meet these challenges, extensive investments are needed 
(Ofgem, 2010b).  
 
As the only proclaimed output-based incentive regulation framework applied 
to electricity networks, we will focus on RIIO in our discussion, below. 
Additionally, we will highlight key takeaways from Ofwat’s new output-based 
(although referred to as outcomes-based) price control for England and Wales’ 
water and sewage sectors due to the similarities between the two approaches. 
Both Ofgem and Ofwat envisages a greater role for consumers compared to 
previous frameworks, seeking ‘to put the customers at the heart of business 
plans (Littlechild, 2016). 
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RIIO 
The RIIO framework builds on the RPI-X model, a form of price cap regulation 
which allows utilities to recover efficient costs linked to inflation with the 
expected efficiency saving subtracted, with added incentives for a wider range 
of outputs.  
 
At the start of the price control period, a set of, supposedly, clearly defined and 
measurable outputs are identified and used to incentivise a desired outcome. 
Allowed revenue is linked to the performance in each of the outlined output 
categories. In the case of RIIO, the outputs are set through stakeholder 
consultations (Ofgem, utilities and customers) and aim to encourage DNOs to 
“play a full role in the delivery of a sustainable energy sector” and to “deliver 
value for money network services for existing and future customers“ (Ofgem, 
2010a, p.1). 
 
2.3.1 Output categories 
The output-oriented approach combines the efficiency mechanisms in a 
revenue cap framework with output-based incentives. In RIIO the outputs are 
set through stakeholder consultations including Ofgem, network utilities and 
customers. Through the consultations, six output categories have been 
identified; Safety, Reliability and Availability, Conditions for Connections, 
Environmental Impact, Social Obligation, and Customer Satisfaction. 
 
2.3.2 Revenue constraint 
The revenue constraint is determined in three parts. First, base revenue is set 
ex ante using the expected efficient costs. When determining the base revenue, 
both quantitative and qualitative measures are used. The price control will be 
based on forecasts of: output requirements; demand for network services; cost 
of deliver and financing costs. This is different from RPI-X where revenue was 
constrained at an allowed rate, the X-factor. However, company data will 
remain the primary source of information for setting the price control and the 
ex ante ‘building block’ approach, i.e. assessing expected efficient cost of 
delivery, depreciation allowances and an allowed return on the regulatory 
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asset value, is still implemented. The final expected efficient cost is set using 
75% of Ofgem benchmarked costs and 25% DNO estimated costs. Second, two 
ad hoc measures – rewards and penalties based on the performance in 
delivering the outputs, and adjustments for uncertainty – are carried out 
throughout the price control period. As such, the revenue of the utilities will 
vary depending on how well the companies perform in terms of outputs 
delivered (Ofgem, 2014; Ofgem, 2013b; Jenkins, 2011). 
 
2.3.3 Output-based incentive regimes and consumer engagement 
Consumer engagement can take different shapes in regulatory regimes. During 
the development of RIIO, Ofgem followed a traditional regulator-led price 
control review, however, with increased involvement by customers and other 
stakeholders. Customer and stakeholders acted as consultees to both the 
regulator and companies, providing input into the regulatory framework as a 
whole, including development of the outputs to be included, as well as on 
individual companies’ business plans. The shape of the customer engagement 
was not stipulated nor was there a requirement that companies and customers 
agree to certain points ahead of Ofgem’s final decision (Bush and Earwaker, 
2015). In the development of RIIO-2, Ofgem is introducing further stakeholder 
engagement models, including a framework-central Challenge Group, open 
public hearings, and a requirement for individual company Customer 
Engagement Groups. Input from all stakeholder and customer engagement 
will inform the regulators final decision (Ofgem, 2018c). 
 
Moreover, Ofwat applies a similar approach to its price control review of water 
and sewage sectors in England and Wales, aiming ‘to put the customers at the 
heart of business plans’ (Littlechild, 2016). Ofwat requires companies engage 
with customers and stakeholders to propose outcomes and delivery 
incentives. Customer Challenge Groups are then responsible for scrutinising 
companies’ proposals and report to Ofwat on the quality of customer 
engagement and how their views are represented in the plans (Ofwat, 2016). 
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It is also possible for stakeholder and customer engagement to play an even 
greater role in defining the overall regulatory framework and details 
determining regulated utilities revenue or price caps. It could be dictated by 
the regulator that companies and their customers agree to certain aspects of 
the regulatory model and the regulator simply act as an arbitrator - only 
stepping in if no agreement is reached. This could take the form as negotiated 
settlements or ‘constructive engagement’2, which is utilised by the aviation 
regulator in the UK (Bush and Earwaker, 2015). 
 
2.4 Discussion 
Regulation of natural monopolies generally aims to mimic a competitive 
market where competition itself is not possible. By including a greater focus 
on outputs and customer views, output-based regulation provides another 
dimension to traditional incentive regulation as firms now must respond to 
customer quality demands and priorities rather than outcomes purely set by 
the regulator. The set outputs, which the network utilities are expected to 
deliver in a given price control period, acts as a contract between the utility 
and the customers. Increased customer engagement in network services and 
regulation is argued to reduce regulatory burden, reduce social conflicts, and 
increase efficiency in planning and development (Tobiasson et al., 2016; 
Doucet ad Littlechild, 2006). 
 
A relevant problem in regulation is information asymmetry between utilities 
and regulator. Incentive regulation reduces information asymmetry and 
increases efficiency by allowing regulated utilities to decide on the use of its 
resources. However, the heavy emphasis on cost-minimisation of input-lead 
incentive regulation has been criticised to reduce service quality in order to 
cut costs and therefore increase profit. For example, in a study on GB DNOs, 
Giannakis et al. (2005) find evidence supporting a possible trade-off between 
costs and quality of service and Ter-Martirosyan and Kwoka (2010) find that 
incentive regulation is associated with longer, yet not necessarily more 
 
2 Note that this does not necessitate an output-based framework. 
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frequent, outages. This is offset when where the regulator incorporates service 
quality standards in the regulatory framework. An output-based method has 
the potential to reduce information asymmetry whilst ensuring quality of 
supply as a result of increased focus on what customers want from network 
services rather than the regulator acting on their behalf (Jenkins, 2011).  
 
Prior to the introduction of RIIO, network companies in GB were used to 
responding to and engaging with Ofgem, acting on behalf of customers. In a 
survey by Utility Week ahead of the implementation of RIIO, DNOs reported to 
be confident that their networks would meet the reliability and security 
demands set by the outputs. However, customer service was highlighted as the 
most difficult area by all responders to the survey (Utility Week, 2013). This 
result is hardly surprising given the priorities to date in the sector. Reliability 
and security have always been a main importance whilst customer 
engagement is a relatively new concept, albeit one proving to be increasingly 
important (Tobiasson et al., 2016; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2012). It could 
also be an indication of a poorly defined remit of how customers are to be 
engaged and how it will feed into the regulatory model or business model. 
Clearly defined guidelines are important given that the sector is new to this 
way of working (Bush and Earwaker, 2015). The more deterministic 
procedures for customer engagement in RIIO-2 is likely a result of this. 
 
Furthermore, with companies heavily involved in developing and setting their 
own outputs, the regulator faces a challenge in ensuring sufficient objectivity 
in the process and independence of consumer groups. Whilst Ofgem declared 
that the plans received ahead of RIIO-1 showed a marked improvement over 
previous price control submissions (Ofgem, 2013c), this could increase 
regulatory burden and higher costs, particularly if a wide range of outputs are 
included. RIIO has been criticised for allowing excessive profits for the 
network utilities (Citizens Advice, 2017). The nature of an ex ante approach 
means that a level of uncertainty is to be expected regarding the accuracy of 
forecasts (Ofgem, 2010a). Still, the increased deliverables in the output-based 
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framework puts greater pressure on network utilities as well as a greater 
burden on the regulator monitoring the sector. 
 
Moreover, increased reliance on customer and stakeholder engagements lead 
to stakeholder fatigue where customers are asked to contribute over a long 
period of time (price control reviews traditionally last for several years and in 
some frameworks customer engagement continue throughout the entire 
period) and comment on multiple companies’ business plans. This issue will 
be exacerbated if more sectors implement a similar approach to regulation, 
demanding the same skill set within the customer base.  
 
Traditionally, input-based regulatory frameworks have had limited customer 
involvement. However, there could be an increased role if the regulator 
stipulates it, without the need to move to a fully output-based method. One 
example is negotiated settlements. However, the narrow focus on inputs limits 
the opportunities of customer engagement to the specific rates used within the 
regulatory framework, for example cost of capital. Additionally, the added 
value of this kind of customer engagement is unclear given inability of 
customers to voice priorities beyond cost-minimisation and the limited 
representation of the customer base due to the need for expert knowledge. 
 
Continued development of RIIO 
In July 2018 Ofgem published its decision on the RIIO-2 framework (Ofgem, 
2018c). RIIO-1 was ground-breaking in many ways and perhaps ahead of its 
time. Change is not happening as quickly as perhaps was envisaged and the 
regulator appears to be taking a step back in RIIO-2. The price control period 
is reverted back to five years, reflecting uncertainty in how the networks will 
be utilised in the future, and there is a renewed focus on efficiency and the 
objectives are simplified and reduced. The key areas from RIIO-1 that are 
maintained and include further stakeholder engagement and opportunity to 
influence and innovate. Ofgem is also set to extend the role of competition in 
energy networks (Ofgem, 2018c).  
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Given the uncertainty going forward, in terms of network utilisation, system 
requirements, technological developments, and customer needs, any 
framework developed and implemented by the regulator must allow for a 
degree of flexibility. This is however not popular with network companies as 
they would prefer certainty of revenue longer term. Flexibility in the 
framework can also lead to increased regulatory burden if many decisions are 
made throughout the price control period rather than set rules agreed and 
determined at the start. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
The energy sector is undergoing a significant change and as the crucial 
physical link between electricity generation and consumers, electricity 
networks is playing a key role. Reaching climate change reduction targets cost 
effectively whilst ensuring security of supply relies on getting the future 
framework for owning, maintaining, upgrading and regulating the networks 
right. The green energy agenda is driving technological change, including 
renewable energy sources, DG, and EVs, which the networks must 
accommodate. Moreover, electricity consumers are becoming increasingly 
aware and active in the market. Technological developments are allowing 
consumers to take more control over their own electricity consumption and 
even the opportunity to become their own producers. Together with larger 
scale DGs, this is providing a significant challenge for transporters of 
electricity as it is becoming increasingly common that electricity may flow 
both ways, rather than following a traditional centralised process: generation 
> transmission network > distribution network > costumer.  
 
In this chapter we look at the ongoing developments within incentive 
regulation, from an input-based framework focusing on cost-minimisation and 
efficiency improvements to an output-based approach where a wide range of 
outputs determine regulated companies’ revenues. We focus particularly on 
the role of customer and stakeholder engagement within the regulatory 
framework. 
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Traditional regulatory regimes are generally focused on cost minimisation and 
efficiency improvements, leaving other objectives largely overlooked. With the 
new regulatory framework RIIO, GB regulator Ofgem introduced a wider set of 
objectives and outputs for network owners to deliver, including more targets 
for delivering timely connections, environmental impact, and customer 
engagement. Customers and stakeholders acted as consultants in the 
development process, a common feature in output-based frameworks.  
 
We find that there are greater opportunities for constructive customer 
engagement within an output-based framework, given the wider range of 
deliverables affecting companies’ revenues. It can be argued that output-based 
regulation provides another dimension to traditional incentive regulation and 
may reduce the impact of information asymmetries between the regulator and 
the regulated companies given the increased reliance on customer 
engagement. However, with companies heavily involved in developing and 
setting their own outputs, the regulator faces a challenge in ensuring sufficient 
objectivity in the process and independence of consumer groups. 
 
Finally, whilst traditionally limited in input-based frameworks, it is possible to 
increase the level of customer engagement regardless of the regulatory 
framework. This can be achieved through negotiated settlements or customer 
determined cost of interruptions in quality of supply incentives. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Vertical Integration, Ownership, and Performance of 
the Norwegian Electricity Distribution Sector 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the 1980s, many countries have liberalised their electricity sector, 
changing its institutional structure. The potentially competitive segments of 
the sector, such as generation and supply, have been vertically separated from 
the naturally monopolistic transmission and distribution networks. 
Privatisation was considered to be the answer to stop spiralling costs and 
improving efficiency in a currently volatile economy. However, due to the lack 
of competition, the transmission and distribution of electricity are subject to 
economic regulation in order to ensure access, security of supply, and fair 
prices for customers. By late 1990s, incentive regulation was common practise 
in many countries aiming to promote improvements in investment and 
operating efficiency (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). 
 
Information asymmetries commonly arise in regulated industries. Firms have 
an informational advantage over the regulator in terms of its actual costs, 
production, technology, and managerial effort, and this is the main barrier to 
successful regulation of natural monopolies (Joskow, 2007; 2008). Much of the 
research and application of regulation attempts to address the issues caused 
by information asymmetry and to reduce its negative impact on social welfare. 
In order to aid the assessment of firms, many regulators rely heavily on 
productivity and efficiency benchmarking. The analysis makes use of 
information from the regulated firms to determine their performance relative 
to a predetermined benchmark. The results are then applied to determine the 
allowed revenue of the utilities (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). Because of the 
weight put on the outcome, i.e. determining firms’ revenue, ensuring accurate 
estimation and measurement of productivity and efficiency is crucial. 
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Regulators have an important task deciding on the regulatory framework. The 
choice of benchmarks and techniques used to measure efficiency is a key factor 
and must accurately reflect the environment in which the firms are working. 
Overall efficiency is a combination of technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency. That is, to be overall efficient firms should aim to move as closely to 
the best-performance frontier by maximising output given available inputs, 
and firms should choose the mix of inputs which produce a given output at 
minimum cost (Coelli et al., 2005). Regulators tend to focus on technical 
efficiency in their analysis as capital-intensive monopolistic industries are 
seldom able to reach allocative efficiency due to firms’ inability to individually 
control their input and output mixes (Coelli et al., 2003). 
 
In this chapter we consider two previously overlooked aspects when assessing 
electricity distribution companies’ efficiency; vertical integration between 
transmission and distribution utilities (i.e. the same company owns both 
transmission and distribution assets) and ownership structure (private or 
public ownership).  
 
Allowing the same company to own two different segments of an otherwise 
unbundled sector is justified through assumed benefits of coordination and 
economies of scale. For example, when the GB electricity sector was liberalised 
in the 1990s, the two Scottish organisations, Scottish Power Transmission (SP 
Transmission) and Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission (SHE Transmission), 
remained vertically integrated with control of all four major segments of the 
sector (namely, generation, transmission, distribution and retailing), north of 
the border. The two companies remain vertically integrated still today, albeit 
with strict business separation requirements to ensure no unjust competitive 
advantage gained from its organisational structure. However, this excludes the 
distribution and transmission network businesses since there are recognised 
potential efficiency gains from economies of scale which outweigh the 
potential disbenefits of allowing the same company own electricity networks 
of different voltages. Furthermore, the EU Third Energy Package was 
introduced in 2009 to further liberalise the energy sector across Europe, 
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including unbundling of vertically integrated businesses. The Scottish TOs are 
certified under a derogation stipulating that special circumstances ensure 
sufficient independence of its transmission business to allow for continued 
integration.  
 
Moreover, believed efficiency gains were one of the major drivers behind 
electricity sector privatisation in the UK during the 1980s and 1990s. This has 
been generally accepted as true, although recently challenged by the UK 
Labour Party, who went to election in 2017 pledging to renationalise big 
utilities due to the profits enjoyed by private companies (The Labour party, 
2017). This has brought the subject of ownership structure and its impact on 
companies’ productivity into focus. 
 
In this chapter we use an unbalanced data set of 100 Norwegian Distribution 
Network Operators (DNOs) from 2007 to 2014 to estimate the impact of the 
ownership structure and electricity network vertical integration on 
companies’ technical inefficiency. We use the econometric statistical 
estimation technique Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to model the effect of 
vertical integration between network levels and ownership structure on 
efficiency. The perceived benefits of vertical integration and private 
ownership in regulated networks has not been assessed in this form before. 
 
The chapter is outlined as follows. Section 3.2 provides a background on the 
theoretical context of regulation and benchmarking as well as review of 
existing empirical literature. Section 3.3 outlines the methodology, describes 
the data, and presents the empirical model. Section 3.4 provides a discussion 
of the results and Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Theoretical and practical context 
 
3.2.1 Information asymmetry 
Naturally monopolistic industries are commonly regulated to evade market 
failures caused by poor economic performance. When a regulator implements 
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a framework, the goals are generally increased efficiency (of costs and 
production) and an aim to improve social welfare. Government intervention of 
any sort comes at a cost and it is therefore important to consider the costs of 
intervention compared to the economic gain. 
 
Regulators have imperfect information regarding the technology, costs, and 
behaviour of the firms that they regulate. Firms on the other hand generally 
have more information about these attributes and can use this to gain a 
strategic advantage. The choice of regulatory framework thus depends on its 
potential to limit or mitigate asymmetric information problems. 
 
Two issues arise from asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Joskow, 2008). Adverse selection arises when a firm is perceived to 
have higher costs than it actually does in order for the regulator set higher 
prices. Moral hazard arises because the regulator is unable to know the 
managerial efforts of the firm. By increasing information availability and 
quality, the regulator can reduce its informational disadvantage. 
 
3.2.2 Regulatory frameworks 
Traditionally two types of regulatory frameworks have been considered when 
regulating privately-owned utilities: price cap and cost of service regulation. 
By setting a price cap or fixed price, firms and its managers are incentivised to 
exert maximum capabilities as any cost reductions remain sole with the firm. 
The problem of moral hazard is thus removed. However, the costs associated 
with adverse selection are fully realised as firms have an incentive to 
exuberate their costs to maximise potential gain. 
 
Additionally, in order for the firms to cover all their costs, the regulator, with 
limited information, would have to set a relatively high price. This would 
increase the rent available to the firm and increase social cost. Cost of service 
on the other hand is able to address adverse selection. Provided that the 
regulator is capable of accurately audit cost, the firm is guaranteed to be 
reimbursed for all its production costs. It has no incentive to exuberate its 
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costs as this will be checked. Meanwhile, the managers of the firm have no 
incentive to increase their efforts to reduce costs either, as the full true cost 
will be recovered. The cost of moral hazard is thus fully realised. 
 
Throughout the years, variations of the two traditional regulatory methods 
have been used, for example sliding scale and yardstick regulation, which 
introduces performance comparison between utilities, to better incentivise 
desired behaviour and improve performance. Today, regulatory frameworks 
tend to be a combination of methods with a relatively large reliance on some 
form of benchmarking (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). 
 
3.2.3 Incentive regulation and benchmarking 
Incentive regulation makes it possible for the regulator to encourage both 
improvements in efficiency and desirable behaviour by rewarding good 
performance and penalising poor performance. Actual performance is 
measured against a predefined benchmark, which will, at least partly, 
determine firms’ rewards (or penalties in case of two-sided incentives). The 
regulator has a challenging task to determine what the benchmarks should be 
and how performance should be measured (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). The 
application of efficiency and productivity analysis in network regulation is a 
response to the information asymmetries that exists between the regulator 
and the firms. Benchmarking of firms make use of available information 
beyond what is revealed by the firm itself. 
 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) provide a good assessment of benchmarking and 
regulation of electricity networks and differentiates between ‘frontier 
benchmarking’, which identifies the efficient performance frontier from the 
best practice in an industry or sample, and ‘average benchmarking’, which 
measures average performance. In recent years, frontier benchmarking is 
more common and includes nonparametric methods such as Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), parametric methods such as Corrected Ordinary 
Least Square (COLS) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) or even models 
with both components, the so-called semiparametric methods. In SFA and 
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COLS, relative efficiency scores are estimated, with SFA recognising the 
possibility of stochastic errors in the measurement of firms’ performance. In 
DEA, on the other hand, the efficiency of firms is computed as the distance to 
the piecewise linear frontier made up of the most efficient firms. That means 
that a number of firms will always be considered fully efficient. An advantage 
of the non-parametric DEA method is that a functional from must not be 
specified and only an assumption about convexity, in terms of the nature of 
production technology, must be made. However, this comes with a major 
disadvantage in that the method is deterministic and is unable to distinguish 
between random noise and inefficiency.  The statistical analysis technique of 
SFA on the other hand allows for separation of random noise from inefficiency 
but estimations need a functional specified, which increases the risks of 
estimation issues (Hjalmarsson et al., 1996). 
 
Norway introduced incentive regulation and efficiency benchmarking in 1997 
and has since used DEA in setting the revenue caps for low (distribution) and 
mid-voltage (regional transmission) networks. 
 
3.2.4 Ownership structure 
When considering ownership structure, privately owned, when compared to 
state owned, companies are often assumed to be more efficient and perform 
better. This has been one of the key drivers behind privatisation in the 
electricity market. However, empirical analysis on the matter of ownership 
structure on large utilities can be argued to be inconclusive. For example, 
when assessing factors that influence the technical efficiency of thermal power 
plants, See and Coelli (2012) find that privately-owned power plants achieve 
on average higher technical efficiencies compared to publicly owned power 
plants. Similar results are found when assessing the impact of the ownership 
form on European and Australian airports, where public airports operate less 
cost efficiently than fully private airports (see Adler and Liebert, 2014). 
Meanwhile, in a study on the US electricity utilities, Atkinson and Halvordsen 
(1988) show that on average publicly owned and privately-owned firms have 
the same level of cost inefficiency. This is, however, disputed when examining 
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the efficiency of the Swedish distribution networks, where privately owned 
companies are relatively more efficient (Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson, 1996). 
 
Whilst the studies on electricity networks ownership structure and impact on 
efficiency are limited and show no conclusive results, continued assessment 
and greater understanding may aid the regulator in reducing the informational 
disadvantage. Additionally, with a major political party pledging to 
renationalise the energy sector, as the UK Labour Party did in 2017, assessing 
the impact of ownership structure on efficiency is as timely as ever (The 
Labour party, 2017). 
 
3.2.5 Vertical integration 
Due to its physical nature, the generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity are highly interdependent. Whilst the technology of storing 
electricity is progressing, it is still not available on a large scale meaning that 
the electricity produced and consumed must always be balanced. Both the 
production and delivery of electricity requires assets that are highly 
specialised and once the assets are in place in one area, they cannot easily be 
redeployed somewhere else. These characteristics indicate that vertical 
integration is an efficient organisational structure (Williamson, 1971). There 
are three main attributes that explain this; i, market distortions are eliminated 
by eliminating markets; ii, coordination of investment in a complex system; 
and iii, risk reduction and risk management (Michaels, 2005).  
 
The Third Energy Package is one of the most important legislations from the 
EU concerning the European gas and electricity markets. It came into force on 
3 September 2009 and is mainly aimed at further liberalising the European 
energy markets. Under the package, energy networks are subject to 
unbundling requirements, which oblige Member States to ensure the 
separation of vertically integrated energy companies. As a result, the various 
segments of the electricity sector (generation, distribution, transmission, and 
supply) should be separate. The introduction of stricter unbundling rules is a 
response to concerns that a vertically integrated company can obstruct 
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competitors’ access to infrastructure, which would prevent competition and 
lead to higher prices for consumers (CEER, 2016b). Despite the EU-wide 
unbundling rules, the two Scottish TOs remain part of vertically integrated 
businesses. The circumstances in the GB energy market are slightly different 
from other European markets with three TOs and one SO. It is common that 
other markets have one, often combined, TO and SO. As such, and with the 
guarantee of effective independence of their transmission businesses, SP 
Transmission and SHE Transmission remain part of vertically integrated 
undertakings (CEER, 2016b). To ensure no unjust competitive advantage, 
Ofgem have stipulated business separation requirements on the companies, 
including rules around accounting, office space, personnel, information 
sharing, and IT systems. The exception, however, regards the distribution and 
transmission network businesses, where a provision in the Electricity 
Directive allows for cooperation to foster the consistency of legal, regulatory 
and technical frameworks in the EU single market. Vertically integrated 
companies are however required to implement a compliance programme to 
ensure that discriminatory and anticompetitive behaviour is prevented 
(European Parliament, 2009). Additionally, all the accounting must remain 
separate and whilst regulated by the same framework, the transmission and 
distribution businesses’ revenues are determined separately, as is the 
assessment of revenue-determining incentives. 
 
Moreover, Norway has about 150 DNOs and about half of them are also 
involved in the operation of regional transmission networks. The accounting, 
revenue regulation, and reporting is kept separate although business can 
benefit from economies of coordination. The Norwegian electricity networks, 
particularly the DNOs, receive significant attention from academics and 
researchers (for example Poudineh and Jamasb (2015); Kumbhakar et al. 
(2015); Growitsch et al. (2012); and Førsund and Kittelsen (1998)). The vast 
and high-quality data that span many years is suitable for applying in a range 
of studies on, for example, different models of productivity and efficiency 
analysis through benchmarking. This work is important since there are many 
different models that can be applied in regulated industries and the outcome 
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often directly influence network companies’ revenues and therefore the price 
that consumers pay. An important aspect is how different variables influence 
network companies’ efficiency. There is however one aspect that has 
previously been overlooked, namely that of vertical integration between 
distribution and transmission assets. 
  
Theoretically, allowing cooperation between networks businesses operating 
in the same region could lead to operating and efficiency advantages, for 
example, by sharing of staff and physical locations and certain assets such as 
depots and maintenance facilities. As such, regional cooperation can benefit 
from economies of coordination. This is recognised in the Third Energy 
Package, which otherwise mainly aimed at increasing electricity sector 
unbundling (European Parliament, 2009). However, the empirical literature 
assessing the alleged economies of coordination and benefits of regional 
coordination between electricity networks are limited.  
 
Pollitt (2008) explores the arguments for and against ownership unbundling 
of energy transmission networks. However, the study experiences difficulty in 
distinguishing and assessing the impact of ownership unbundling from the 
general impact of electricity reform and liberalisation. Availability of 
appropriate data will be an issue because many countries either have a limited 
number to network owners (for example GB with only two vertically 
integrated network businesses) or adopted strict rules of network unbundling 
at the time of the reform, making it difficult for comparative studies. 
 
Instead, it is more common with the analysis of unbundling of competitive and 
monopolistic elements of the electricity supply chain, for example Filippini 
and Wetzel (2014) showing that ownership separation of electricity 
generation and retail operations from the distribution network appear to have 
a positive effect on the cost efficiency of distribution companies in New 
Zealand, and Gugler et al. (2017) indicating potential scope economies 
between the stages of upstream generation and downstream transmission in 
Europe. 
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3.2.6 The Norwegian setting 
Norway was one of the first countries, following Chile and the UK, to liberalise 
and reform the power sector. However, unlike the market-based approach and 
privatisation of UK state-owned utilities, the Norwegian power industry 
remained mainly under state and local municipalities’ control. Following the 
implementation of the Norwegian Energy Act in 1991, The Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) was appointed the sector regulator. 
The authority was, prior to the deregulation, in charge of the oversight of the 
power sector as well as water resources and flood control. 
 
The Norwegian electricity grid is divided into three levels: central network, 
regional network, and distribution network. State-owned Statnett owns most 
of the central grid (about 90%), which constitutes the bulk of the high voltage 
transmission grid. Statnett is also Norway’s Transmission System Operator 
(SO), thus in charge of balancing the production and consumption of 
electricity. Norway has over 150 distribution network owners, responsible for 
the lower voltage section of the grid. In 1997, NVE introduced an incentive-
based regulatory framework to encourage utilities to reduce costs and 
improve their efficiency. The allowed revenue is set using total cost 
benchmarking according to the formula in (1): 
 
  𝑅𝐶𝑡 = 0.4𝐶𝑡 + 0.6(𝐶𝑡
∗)    (1) 
 
where RCt is the revenue cap in year t, Ct is the cost base (actual) for each 
network company and Ct* is the cost norm (efficient) for the company. Ct and 
Ct* are both calculated using data from t-2 and Ct* is obtained through DEA 
programmed to benchmark the companies costs. Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) is then used to correct the DEA results for environmental factors (NVE, 
2012). The revenue cap is thus determined using a share of actual cost and the 
norm cost. The incentive power of regulation and stimulated competition 
among utilities to improve cost efficiency is achieved by placing a higher 
weight on the norm cost. That is, by putting a higher weight on the norm cost, 
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the regulator is incentivising firms to move closer to the frontier of best-
performance. 
 
The cost base is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑡 = (𝑂𝑀𝑡−2 + 𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑡−2) ×
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−2
+ 𝑃𝐿𝑡−2 × 𝑃𝑡 
+𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑡−2 + 𝑅𝐴𝐵𝑡−2 × 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡    (2) 
 
where OM is the operation and maintenance costs, CEN is the company’s costs 
of energy not supplied. Multiplying actual power loss (PL) with the reference 
price of power (P, given by a volume-weighted monthly area spot price from 
Nord Pool Spot) gives the cost of power losses, whilst DEP is depreciation and 
RAB is the regulatory asset base (book value plus 1% working capital). WACC 
(Weighted Average Cost of Capital) is defined by NVE to calculate the capital 
cost of each company. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
The application of SFA allows for the modelling of a frontier within a 
regression framework so that inefficiency can be estimated. This is important 
in the present analysis as we are interested in measuring the effect of vertical 
integration between electricity networks and ownership structure on 
efficiency. This has previously not been done before with regards to electricity 
distribution networks, although, as outlined in the sections above, are applied 
in the real world based on theoretical assumptions. Testing these assumptions 
should therefore be of interest to regulators, policymakers and consumers 
alike.  
 
Whilst the effect of vertical integration and ownership structure may be a 
novel approach, the method, SFA, has been used by several authors to evaluate 
electricity network efficiency. Llorca et al. (2016) use SFA to analyse US 
network firms’ performance including environmental factors in the modelling 
to find that efficiency has declined and diverged over time. Growitsch et al. 
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(2012) use Norwegian distribution network data to examine the efficiency 
effects of observed and unobserved heterogeneity. The results indicate that 
the observed environmental factors have a limited impact on firms’ average 
efficiency – a significant finding given the Norwegian regulator’s reliance on 
environmental factors in the regulatory model. Meanwhile, Poudineh and 
Jamasb (2015), estimate an SFA model to estimate the relationship between 
cost efficiency and investment among DNOs in Norway with results found to 
depend on the size of the network.  
  
3.3.1 Model specification 
Following Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) we 
specify a stochastic cost frontier model with a convoluted error composed on 
two random terms. This is in order to capture both uncontrollable or 
unobservable aspects as well as deviations with respect to the frontier of best-
performance that can be attributed to managerial inefficiency. The general SFA 
model for a cost function to be estimated is presented in (3) as follows: 
 
ln 𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (3) 
 
where i stands for utilities, t for time, Cit represents utilities’ total cost, Xit is a 
vector of explanatory variables that includes outputs, input prices and other 
control variables, whilst α and β are parameters to be estimated. Deviations 
with respect to the cost function are illustrated by v and u, where vit is the 
traditional noise term and uit captures utilities’ inefficiency. The model 
assumes symmetric random noise, vit∼N(0  𝜎𝑣
2 ), whilst the inefficiency is a 
positive one-sided error term that can follow distributions such as the half-
normal, truncated normal or exponential. If we assume in equation (3) that the 
inefficiency term is homoscedastic, we are unable to examine the drivers 
behind utilities’ performance, which might produce biased estimates of the 
inefficiency scores and frontier coefficients (Caudill and Ford, 1993). In order 
to get around this issue and to allow us to examine the impact of ownership 
structure and vertical integration on utilities’ technical inefficiency, we will 
instead estimate a heteroscedastic stochastic frontier model including a set of 
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contextual variables in the inefficiency term. These contextual variables 
(frequently called environmental or z-variables) can be introduced in the 
model through the pre-truncation mean, the pre-truncation variance or 
simultaneously in both parts of the inefficiency term (see for instance, Llorca 
et al., 2016).  
 
In this chapter we estimate a model in which the environmental variables 
enter through the pre-truncation variance of the inefficiency term as proposed 
by Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Caudill and Ford (1993) or Caudill et 
al. (1995). This type of model has an appealing economic interpretation. There 
is a base efficiency level of the utilities that captures things like managers’ 
natural skills, while how well these natural skills are exploited depends on the 
set of contextual variables introduced in the inefficiency term (Alvarez et al, 
2006). 
 
3.3.2 Data 
In this chapter we use an unbalanced panel data set of 100 Norwegian DNOs. 
The data comprise economic, technical, and environmental information 
collected by NVE between 2007 and 2014. Several observations were dropped 
from the data set due to missing values in key variables, lack of information on 
contextual variables, extreme outliers in terms of size, or unexplained values, 
such as negative or zero cost information. 
 
We specify a cost function with total cost (totex) as the dependent variable. 
Following NVE’s approach, we specify totex as the social cost, that is, including 
external (customer) quality costs. Totex is made up of capital expenditure 
(capex), including Cost of Energy Not Supplied (cens), operational expenditure 
(opex), and losses. The cost of losses is calculated by multiplying physical 
network energy losses with annual average system price. cens is calculated by 
multiplying the energy not served/interrupted (which includes details on 
length of interruptions, time and day of the interruption and if the interruption 
was planned or not planned) with consumer willingness to pay to avoid 
interruptions. The current framework includes willingness to pay for six 
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different consumer groups. NVE introduced quality adjusted revenue caps in 
2001 with the cens-arrangement to ensure that efficiency improvements the 
operation of networks came at a cost of reduced service quality. Including 
consumers in determining the cost ensures that the service quality is not 
improved beyond a level and cost that consumers are willing to pay for, thus 
providing consumers the opportunity to influence the regulatory process.  
Since 2001, NVE has extended the framework on a number of occasions, for 
example in 2009 to include interruptions longer than three minutes and the 
classification of different customer groups (NVE, 2016). All monetary 
variables are measured in 1000 NOK and in 2014 real terms. We have used 
consumer price index to deflate the monetary variables. 
 
The choice of variables is an important consideration and the subject of much 
debate. Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) show this in a review of international 
benchmarking methodologies, indicating no clear consensus of the variables 
to be used to assess networks’ performance. The Norwegian regulator 
assesses its model regularly and calibrates to ensure best fit. We consider the 
utilities able to control its inputs and therefore, by using the social cost, put 
greater weight on quality of supply as a direct consequence of utilities’ choices. 
Generally, network outputs are considered more difficult for utilities to 
influence. 
 
The outputs in our model are number of network stations (substations) and 
number of customers, used to illustrate network size. We included the variable 
length of network in early testing, which can also be considered a proxy of 
network size but decided to drop this due to correlation with the other 
variables. We also use two input prices; cost of capital, which is NVE’s 
determined rent for cost of capital, and labour price, which is the average 
salary in the sector. We use the cost of capital to impose homogeneity of degree 
one in input prices. 
 
The main focus of this chapter is to study the impact on efficiency of vertical 
integration between different network levels and ownership structure. In this 
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sample we introduce a dummy variable to capture the impact of integration 
between the distribution network and the regional transmission network, that 
is, the same utility owns both distribution and regional transmission assets. 
Networks of different voltage owned by the same utility is separate from an 
accounting perspective however would in theory be able to benefit from 
knowledge sharing and resource optimisation (see section 3.2.5 for further 
discussion). 54% of DNOs in our sample are also involved in operating or own 
regional transmission assets. Ownership structure is presented in three 
different categories, each variable representing the share of ownership within 
a certain category: State owned, municipal/council owned, and private 
company owned. The network companies in the sample are either fully within 
one ownership category (100%) or split between two ownership categories 
(e.g. 75%-25%). Traditionally the lower voltage networks were owned by the 
council or municipality but may also have been developed by private 
companies to support an energy intensive industry. These variables are 
expected to affect utilities’ performance and are therefore, together with a 
variable measuring the number of islands at least 1km from the coast within 
the network, included as inefficiency determinants. 
 
Whist the number of islands within the networks service areas is likely to have 
an impact on DNOs costs, it is also helpful in reducing the impact on the 
analysis of uncontrollable characteristics of individual networks. We include a 
time trend to account for technical change and can capture issues such as, for 
example, changes in the regulatory environment. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 
presents the descriptive statistics and details of the variables included in our 
analysis. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Totex 972 109076 246590 840 2390549 
Number of customers 972 22750 67265 18 682253 
Number of network stations 972 800 1473 9 11474 
Number of islands 1km from 
coast 
972 2.50 5.43 0 30 
Vertical integration 972 0.54 0.50 0 1 
 
Vertical integration 972 observations Dummy variable where 1 = 
ownership of both distribution 
and regional transmission 
assets, 54% in the sample. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Distribution of ownership structure 
 
 
 
3.4 Results and discussion 
Our main model is a translog cost function, including a full set of interaction 
terms between outputs and input prices. The variables are in logarithms 
except the time trend. Homogeneity of degree one in prices is imposed by 
normalising cost and labour price with capital price. The estimated equation 
can be written as follows: 
 
Council
Private
Council & Private
State & Council
State & Private
State & Council & Private
State
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where kp is capital price, lp is labour price, i and t stand for the utility and time, 
respectively. y stands for the vector of outputs and α and β are parameters to 
be estimated. In addition, we have also estimated a cost function using a Cobb-
Douglas specification and a translog specification without including 
inefficiency determinants. The output from these can be found in table 3.2 
whilst the result of the estimation of our translog model with inefficiency 
determinants is illustrated in table 3.3. 
 
The results display the expected signs for the coefficients of outputs and input 
prices, with labour price as major cost driver followed by number of network 
stations. 
 
The aggregation of the three ownership variables is 100%, meaning that one 
variable will be dropped from the estimation due to collinearity. In this case, 
the State owned variable is dropped and therefore the remaining variables, 
Council owned and Privately owned should be interpreted with respect to that 
variable. Our results indicate that an increase in Private ownership, with 
respect to State ownership, does not have a significant effect on cost 
inefficiency. However, an increase in Council ownership, with respect to State 
ownership, indicates a reduction in cost inefficiency. 
 
The frontier parameters show the expected signs and in general, and all 
models perform well. The magnitude of the coefficients remains stable across 
the models, as is the significance of the results. The two variables used to 
illustrate network size both show positive signs, of similar magnitude, and an 
increase in the price of labour is, as expected, also found to increase totex. 
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Table 3.2 Parameter estimates – Cobb-Douglas and translog without 
inefficiency determinants 
  
Translog                             Cobb-Douglas 
 ln totex Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Frontier        
 
intercept 13.477 *** 0. 056 13. 316 *** 0.009 
 
ln customers 0.436 *** 0.024 0. 405 *** 0.022 
 
ln network stations 0.461 *** 0.024 0.500 *** 0.026 
 
ln labour price 0. 630 *** 0.103 0.857 *** 0.037 
 
ln customers2 0.495 *** 0. 026 
   
 
ln network 
stations2 
0.639 *** 0.063 
   
 
ln labour price2 - 2.525 * 1.474 
   
 
ln customers*ln 
network stations 
-0. 559 *** 0. 041 
   
 
ln customers*ln 
labour price 
-0. 001 
 
0. 084 
   
 
ln networks 
stations 
*ln labour price 
0. 043 
 
0. 102 
   
 
time 0. 015 
 
0. 016 -0.036 *** 0.005 
 
time2 -0. 072 ** 0. 025 
   
 
ln customers * time 0. 006 
 
0. 010 
   
 
ln network 
stations*time 
-0. 003 
 
0. 013 
   
 
ln labour 
price*time 
0. 405 ** 0. 203 
   
Inefficiency 
       
 
intercept -5.977 *** 1.997 -3.474 *** 0.112 
Noise 
       
 
intercept -3.321 *** 0. 146 -3.773 *** 0. 077 
         
Significance code: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.3 Parameter estimates – translog with inefficiency 
determinants 
 ln totex Coefficients  SE 
Frontier 
    
 
Intercept 13.46 *** 0.025 
 
ln customers 0.429 *** 0.020 
 
ln network stations 0.454 *** 0.023 
 
ln labour price 0.607 *** 0.099 
 
ln customers2 0.501 *** 0.026 
 
ln network stations2 0.680 *** 0.061 
 
ln labour price2 -2.016 
 
1.408 
 
ln customers*network stations -0.583 *** 0.040 
 
ln customers*labour price -0.011 
 
0.086 
 
ln networks stations*labour 
price 
-0.029 
 
0.103 
 
time 0.014 
 
0.016 
 
time2 -0.067 *** 0.025 
 
ln customers*time 0.010 
 
0.011 
 
ln network stations*time -0.007 ** 0.013 
 
ln labour cost*time 0.341 * 0.194 
Inefficiency 
    
 
Intercept -6.501 *** 0. 520 
 
Vertical integration 1.451 *** 0. 417 
 
Council owned -0. 023 ** 0.011 
 
Privately owned -0. 008 
 
0.011 
 
State owned 
  
(omitted) 
 
Islands 0.130 *** 0. 021 
Noise 
    
 
Intercept -3.557 * 0.058 
     
Significance code: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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The Norwegian electricity industry was largely developed on a regional level 
around small-scale hydro plants and when the sector was unbundled much of 
the network ownership remained under council ownership. It is also clear 
from the sample that many large industries privately own the networks 
supplying their businesses. This is most likely still in place from when the 
country was industrialised and small-scale generation was developed to 
provide power to factories allowing greater economic opportunities for rural 
areas. Only later was the large high-voltage system developed connecting the 
regional grids. The local experience and knowhow of many years may now 
therefore serve to benefit efficient operation of the distribution networks. It is 
also possible that the state-owned lower-voltage networks are overlooked as 
the state’s main interest in networks generally lies in the high-voltage central 
network. 
 
Moreover, with a positive sign, the results indicated that vertical integration 
between the different network levels increase cost inefficiency. Although 
previous studies are limited in this area, following theoretical thinking on the 
potential of economies of scale and opportunity of efficient resource 
allocation, the results may appear somewhat surprising. For example, the 
Third Energy Package allows for regional cooperation between electricity 
networks to take advantage of perceived economies of coordination and the 
theoretical work on the subject by Williamson (1971) indicate that vertical 
integration in energy system is an efficient organisational structure. This is 
however based on the assumptions that the network businesses are located in 
the same region. This information is unavailable in our data, although one 
might assume that where utilities own assets across both distribution and 
regional transmission levels that these are located in the same area. However, 
yhis may not always the case. For example, in GB, the Scottish network owners 
own both distribution and transmission assets in Scotland in addition to 
distribution networks in England - these are not physically connected to the 
Scottish assets. As such, with assets covering different areas, the opportunity 
for efficient sharing of labour and other inputs are limited and as a result, the 
potential efficiency gains of the same firm owning networks of different 
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voltages are reduced Furthermore, both in GB and Norway, revenue for 
electricity networks of different voltage levels  are determined using separate 
price controls. Although similar in nature in terms of the framework, 
incentives and objectives, differences, differences exist. 
 
In Norway, part of the regulatory differences lie in the variables used in the 
benchmarking model, where the distribution assessment utilise inputs such as 
number of customers, kilometres of overhead line and number of network 
stations, whilst the regional transmission assessment include weighted values 
of different underground and overhead lines. With heavy reliance on the 
benchmarking exercise to determine utilities’ revenue, it may therefore be 
possible that network owners allocate costs to where overall revenue is 
maximised. Although the regulator will do everything in its powers to prevent 
this kind of behaviour, its informational disadvantage will possibly act to limit 
its success. Information asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated 
firm is one the key issues in the regulation of natural monopolies. 
Benchmarking is often used as a tool to reduce the firms’ informational 
advantage. Nevertheless, strategic behaviour or regulator gambling is still 
possible. For example, Jamasb et al. (2003) find in a survey study of energy 
regulators that firms are gaming the regulator’s benchmarking model in a 
number of ways that are contrary to the intentions of the regulatory 
framework. Regulators appear to be aware of this and although not usually 
illegal, it leads to forgone efficiency improvements, reduced social welfare and 
a welfare transfer between customers and the firms. Similarly, De Witte and 
Marques (2012) identify gaming by firms in the water sector in regulatory 
frameworks applying benchmarking. 
 
Moreover, as the number of islands at least 1km away from the cost increase, 
so does utility inefficiency. This is expected given the impact on cost of subsea 
cables, maintenance and possibly reduced reliability. This is good example of 
a variable that firms are unable to change to impact performance. However, 
with the variable being significant, it is an indication of the operational 
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difficulties of certain regions and one that should be considered by regulators 
to account for performance determining uncontrollable factors. 
 
Figure 3.2 depicts a histogram of efficiency scores for the firms using the 
translog model with inefficiency determinants. The average efficiency in the 
sample is 93.6%, which is in line with previous studies of Norwegian networks, 
see for example Senyonga and Bergland (2018). 
 
Figure 3.3 graphs the average efficiency score for each year. It appears as 
though the average level of efficiency is fairly steady year on year although 
possibly a slight indication of decreasing towards the end of the sample. It also 
appears as though firms’ performance increasingly diverge over time. This 
should be of interest to the regulator and indicate that there are possible 
efficiency improvements possible among DNOs. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Histogram of efficiency scores 
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Figure 3.3 Annual evolution of efficiency 
 
 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
Effective economic regulation of electricity networks has been a goal of most 
developed countries following energy industry liberalisation in the 1980s and 
1990s. Incentivising network owners to behave in a way to mimic competition 
is seen as the second best option after actual competition, which is normally 
not possible in natural monopolies. 
 
Information asymmetries, where firms have an informational advantage over 
the regulator in terms of its actual costs, production, technology, and 
managerial effort, commonly arise in regulated industries. The regulator is 
therefore at a disadvantage when determining revenue allowances. As a result, 
many regulators rely heavily on productivity and efficiency benchmarking to 
assess firms performance. The choice of benchmarks and techniques used to 
measure efficiency is a key factor and must accurately reflect the environment 
in which the firms are working. If applied correctly, the sector regulator can 
reduce the informational disadvantage and encourage efficiency improvement 
among the network utilities. 
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In this chapter we have analysed the performance of Norwegian DNOs using a 
data sample from 2007 to 2014 applied to stochastic frontier models. We 
contribute to the literature by looking at the impact of two, previously largely 
overlooked, areas in this sector; vertical integration between network levels 
and ownership structure. 
 
The results are interesting from mainly a policy perspective. Generally, we find 
no real improvements in efficiency over time. Rather, we possibly see a slight 
downward trend and greater firm divergence. This suggests that 
improvements are possible. 
 
Moreover, we find that vertical integration between the DNO and regional 
transmission levels increase technical inefficiency, that its, network owners 
with an interest across network levels are likely to be less efficient in its 
operation of the lower level network. Assumptions of economies of scale and 
resource sharing does therefore not hold true in this instance. It may also be 
that the DNOs are able to shift costs between the network levels depending on 
the more favourable regulatory framework, i.e. gaming of the regulator. 
Vertical integration between network levels is therefore an area that would 
benefit from further consideration. 
 
The result on ownership structure indicates that an increase in Private 
ownership, with respect to State ownership, does not have a significant effect 
on cost inefficiency. However, an increase in Council ownership, with respect 
to State ownership, indicates a reduction in cost inefficiency. This is possibly 
explained by the state generally having a main interest in high voltage 
electricity networks, rather than low voltage, and the decentralised model 
which the now centralised system once was developed from. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Solution that Might Have Been: Resolving Social 
Conflict in Deliberations about Future Electricity Grid 
Developments 
 
4.1 Introduction 
A timely development of national infrastructures is a prerequisite for 
economic growth and is generally associated with significant economic and 
social returns (Easterly and Servén, 2003). Such undertakings include 
electricity transmission networks,3 which following ambitious environmental 
targets need to connect a growing number of renewable energy facilities. 
Government policy is thus driving a rapid expansion of the transmission 
network, unseen in modern time for similarly sized infrastructure networks, 
such as the railways. Albeit their economic benefits, grid development projects 
often involve adverse environmental impacts and give rise to community 
opposition.4 Failing to reach agreement on deployment and siting of projects 
causes lengthy and costly delays and may even jeopardise the project 
altogether (Furby et al. 1988; Kunreuther and Easterling 1996; RGI, 2012). 
 
Although community opposition to major national infrastructure projects is 
not new, the implications of local resistance for the future development of the 
sector are on the rise. The context of decision-making in the electricity sector 
has gradually shifted from one of being a primarily technical matter to an 
increasingly social, environmental, and thus political one. However, due to the 
technical nature of the electricity grid and importance to the functioning of any 
modern economy (there are currently no viable alternatives) this shift has 
 
3 Grid developments can also include the lower voltage network, distribution, however, this 
chapter focuses on transmission developments only. 
4 Apart from transmission grid development, other developments that cause local opposition 
include airports, prisons, power plants and linear structures such as pipelines, and railways. 
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been slow. The current process, which can be described as a Decide-Announce-
Defend approach, is perceived to be unfair and to lack transparency 
(Tobiasson et al., 2016). The roles of different stakeholders are also unclear as 
is the process of how decisions are made, therefore eradicating potential local 
and public participation due to a lack of knowledge and information (Cotton 
and Devine-Wright, 2013). Consequently, the established decision-making 
framework and processes seem increasingly ineffective to engage with more 
active local communities. 
 
There are three main reasons behind the increased involvement of the public 
and local communities in grid developments. First, the nature of the energy 
industry has been changing due to the emergence of smaller but more 
numerous generation facilities, thus increasing their visibility and potential 
local impact. Second, the public and community awareness and engagement in 
relation to the energy sector and environmental issues has increased. Third, 
as the nature of the sector and public engagement with the grid has changed, 
the institutional arrangements within which policy decisions are made have 
not changed. Thus, an innovative approach is required to adapt the decision-
making framework to better suit the evolving and future needs and features of 
the sector. 
 
From an economic point of view, local opposition can be considered as the 
result of externalities caused by grid developments and imposed on 
neighbouring communities. Given the standard assumptions of economic 
rationality, perfect information and zero transaction costs, a solution that 
internalises the local externalities can, in theory, be derived. With regards to 
single location facilities (e.g. generation facility), the potential for providing 
financial compensation to affected communities is explored in an extensive 
body of literature, initiated first by O’Hare (1977). 
 
However, the practical applications of a financial compensation are not trivial, 
including the difficulty in estimating the exact costs and benefits of projects 
and the public perception of compensation as a bribe (Frey et al., 1996). Other 
 69 
measures to foster acceptance and to increase the local retention of profits 
include the provision of community benefit schemes. These measures are 
particularly common in wind power developments and have been successfully 
implemented in countries such as the UK, Denmark and Germany (CSE, 2009; 
Cass et al., 2010). 
 
Relative to renewable energy developments and other single location 
infrastructure facilities, transmission network developments have received 
comparatively limited attention from academic researchers (notable 
exceptions include Tobiasson et al., 2016; Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013; Cotton 
and Devine-Wright, 2013; Soini et al., 2011). This is particularly the case with 
regards to compensation or community benefit schemes. Arguably, there are 
some shared characteristics between single location facilities and grid 
developments, such as large sunk costs, negative externalities, public goods, 
information asymmetries and similarities in resistance from local 
communities. However, the technical characteristics and economic regulation 
of transmission grids necessitate design of innovative approaches to organise 
local community impact and involvement in grid development. Therefore, 
there is a need for alternative modes of conceptualising community opposition 
and engagement with grid development projects (Batel et al., 2013).  
 
Drawing from established economic theories and concepts found in New 
Institutional Economics, this chapter outlines a qualitative assessment and 
suggests a new approach based on the environmental sustainability 
perspective to facilitate a sustainable and more efficient planning and 
implementation of transmission projects. The conceptual framework 
presented here aims to look beyond the simple use of financial compensation 
to resolve social conflict in grid and other similar infrastructure development 
projects. Instead, we propose an economic theory-informed and 
sustainability-oriented methodology which also requires a multidisciplinary 
approach to the problem. 
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The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 outlines the economic 
properties of electricity networks and developments. Section 4.3 discusses the 
economics characteristics of community engagement in developments and 
reviews relevant literature. Section 4.4 outlines and applies an analytical 
framework to develop a conceptual model. Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Economics of Electricity Networks and Grid Development 
 
4.2.1 Economic characteristics of electricity transmission networks 
Electricity networks are regarded as natural monopolies. This implies that 
they are highly capital intensive and their cost structure is such that their fixed 
costs are very large in relation to the total costs. This feature results in 
declining average costs as their scale increases. As a result, the provision of a 
given quantity of output by a single network is more cost efficient than by 
several competing networks. Consequently, such networks are subject to 
public ownership or some form of economic regulation. This is true for both 
high voltage networks (transmission) and lower voltage networks 
(distribution). Although this chapter considers transmission developments 
only, it is worth noting that the distribution networks across Europe are 
undergoing a considerable change.  
 
The introduction of smart technology, electric vehicles, and distributed 
generation are exerting pressure on the distribution grid to become more 
active in terms of managing and matching the supply and demand. The 
transmission grid is less affected by the new technologies and is, compared to 
the distribution grid, already actively managing supply and demand since 
electricity generators are traditionally connected to the transmission grid. 
Moreover, transmission networks are considered to be transportation 
networks – transporting large volumes of high voltage electricity over long 
distances with no or few outlets along the way. This gives rise to particular 
issues as a number of communities along large transmission lines benefit little 
from the developments despite living next to it. 
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Network utilities generally operate under licence agreements that oblige them 
to connect the generators and end-users in a timely and effective manner. The 
utilities are also expected to operate the network in a cost-efficient manner. In 
return, the utility can charge the users for the use of network services and earn 
a regulated return or revenue (Joskow, 2007). The network charges are, in the 
first instance, accrued to generators and retail suppliers but are ultimately 
passed to end users through their bills. Many networks in Europe operate 
under incentive regulation models that reward firms for cost efficiency and 
penalises high costs (Joskow, 2013). 
 
The costs incurred by network utilities can be classified into allowable 
controllable and non-controllable costs. Non-controllable costs are regarded 
as being beyond the control of the management and are generally treated as 
pass-through and thus do not affect the profits of the utility. On the other hand, 
controllable costs are subject to reward and penalty incentives. A cost type or 
item that is disallowed by the regulator will directly and negatively affect the 
revenue and profit of the utility. Allowed operating costs can be recovered and 
allowed investments will earn a specified return (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). 
 
A key objective of the sector regulator is to maximise the socio-economic 
welfare of the consumers. The regulator in effect acts as the guardian of public 
interest who cannot individually protect their interest. Costs that are over and 
above the efficient level will reduce the net system benefits. Although major 
grid projects may have net system benefits, uneven distribution of the costs 
and benefits can cause distributional implications between local and national 
interests. It appears that while regulators are tasked with protecting public 
interest they are less able to balance the distributional inequity that arise 
between the local public and wider public. Compensations to local 
communities are also a financial transfer to ease the distributional 
implications between the communities and the consumers of the grid services 
as a whole. Prior to addressing the specific methods and mechanisms for 
compensation or community benefits, it is important to conceptualise the 
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nature of community level environmental impact and entitlement to 
compensation in economic terms. 
 
4.2.2 Economic characteristics of transmission projects  
Transmission lines cross long stretches of land and each new project has a 
number of stakeholders, including the government, local authority, local 
businesses, landowners, local communities, and interest organisations. Each 
stakeholder perceives the grid projects differently and has their own view and 
experience of the decision process. These heterogeneous views and objectives 
of stakeholders often cause conflict of interest and opposition. Moreover, 
information asymmetries among the actors can intensify the frictions between 
stakeholders further as it can induce rent-seeking behaviour and reduce trust 
between them. Consequently, the economics of grid development can be 
characterised as having high transaction costs. Achieving agreements that 
internalise the externalities caused by transmission projects can be costly to 
negotiate, especially when the number of stakeholders and the range of 
interests involved is large (Tobiasson et al., 2016). 
 
A grid project can be thought of as having two types of costs – i.e., private costs 
in the form of construction and maintenance costs as well as external costs 
accrued to third parties. The latter type of costs can include direct economic 
costs, for example, loss of revenue to owners of agricultural land, and as in the 
form of negative environmental externalities. The direct economic costs are 
generally observable and measurable through market prices or compensation 
methods. For instance, there are established norms and formulas for 
compensating owners of farmlands for loss of use value of land in terms of lost 
output and revenue5. 
 
The main difficulty arises, however, when taking the external costs in the form 
of intrinsic value of environmental amenities accrued to third parties, i.e., 
 
5 Example from Canada: 
http://www.albertapowerline.com/resources/Documents/3012_APL_ROW_Compensation_
Program_info_sheet_Final.pdf, and GB: 
http://www.northernpowergrid.com/asset/0/document/1949.pdf 
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affected communities, into account. Grid development projects can be viewed 
as having an effect on public goods characterised by non-excludability and 
non-rivalry in consumption. The communities along the new lines enjoy 
limited or no direct benefits from the project, similar to a railway passing the 
community without stopping at the local station. The effects of these 
externalities such as negative visual, health, and environmental effects as well 
as financial loss through reduced property values, translate into reduced 
utility and economic welfare (Cohen et al., 2014).6  
 
4.3 Community Engagement and Conflict in Grid 
Development 
 
4.3.1 The causes of conflicts 
A growing body of literature considers the motives behind and discusses 
possible measures to reduce community opposition to locally unwanted 
facilities. The pejorative label of NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) opposition is 
considered as outdated (Burningham et al., 2006) and recent work has 
revealed a complex heterogeneous composition of opposition (Batel and 
Devine-Wright, 2014; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2013; Johnson and 
Scicchitano, 2012; Wolsink, 2000).7 Research to date is predominantly focused 
on single location facilities, such as renewable energy generation technologies 
(Jobert et al., 2007; Wolsink, 2000; Devine-Wright, 2011), as well as waste and 
hazardous facilities (Johnson and Scicchitano, 2012; Kunreuther and 
Easterling., 1996; Kunreuther et al., 1994).  
 
Opposition to transmission projects, characterised as linear infrastructure, are 
similar to those of single location infrastructure. The main triggers of public 
 
6 In the absence of explicit valuation, public goods can implicitly be assigned a monetary value 
of zero. Some scholars disagree with monetising environmental resources on ethical grounds. 
However, when the value of a resource is unknown or is valued at zero, it may be over-
exploited. This often holds for resources that lack clearly defined property rights giving rise 
to conflicts of interest. Some view monetisation as a second best option, while accepting that 
the valuation can be flawed but that any value over zero is better than no value. 
7 Rather than the homogeneous assumptions defining NIMBY opposition. 
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resistance include strong place attachments to the local area; the type, level 
and quality of communication; lack of trust for the developer and 
governmental agencies; harmful effects on health and the environment; and 
unconvincing arguments for the need case of the new line and for any 
beneficial impacts arising from it (Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013; Cotton and 
Devine-Wright, 2013; Devine-Wright, 2013).8 
 
Unlike local communities, landowners tend to be consulted at the initial stages 
of planning when the optimal route is being identified, mainly because they 
possess a legal right to their land and others cannot normally use the land 
without their consent. In theory, financial compensation offered at the market 
rate of the land should be accepted. However, in practice, this is not always the 
case, as seen in the development of an Irish gas pipeline where five landowners 
were imprisoned following their refusal to allow the developer access to their 
land (Gilmartin, 2009).9  
 
Public and local opposition to new transmission lines is a common cause of 
costly delays and can emerge as a barrier to the realisation of future low-
carbon systems. Recent cases of conflicts include the Scottish Beauly-Denny 
line, which was the subject of the longest ever public inquiry in Scotland, 
studied in Chapter 5 (Tobiasson et al., 2016); the France-Spain 
interconnection project, first proposed in 1980 and met by considerable 
opposition bringing round a second proposal in 2003 (Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 
2013); and the Norwegian Hardanger transmission line, which was one of the 
2010’s most reported news stories in Norway (Ruud et al., 2011). 
 
Devine-Wright et al. (2010) find that public beliefs of energy networks are 
rather detached from reality. Generally, electricity networks are seen to be 
represented by technological structures, such as cables and pylons, rather 
 
8 Criticism of the need case often refer to alternative technological solutions, e.g., distributed 
generation and enforcing existing lines. 
9 However, compensation to landowners is not considered here as each sector has established 
norms and methods of addressing direct losses. In this chapter we focus on the environmental 
impacts of grid development projects on local communities, which are often ignored. 
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than organisations and systematic networks. Moreover, in the planning of new 
lines, the study found great disbelief in the process, especially regarding 
stakeholder engagement and who can actually influence project 
developments. The invisibility of network firms and disbelief in the planning 
process is thought to increase public opposition and delays to new network 
developments. The invisibility and lack of already established consumer-firm 
relationships is one of the distinguishing features of transmission 
developments when considered alongside other linear infrastructure 
networks, such as railways. 
 
Public opposition is argued to have played a large role in the delayed France-
Spain interconnection project (Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013). The project 
lacked transparency and the public requests of undergrounding the line were 
ignored without explanation. As a result, citizens felt overlooked and 
cooperation between stakeholders ceased. Similarly, the Scottish Beauly-
Denny project was criticised by local communities for disregarding their 
points of view and lack of communication. Trust and perceived procedural 
justice is arguably important for public acceptance (Bronfman et al., 2012; 
Wüstenhagen et al., 2007).  
 
Moreover, in a study on electricity generation sources Bronfman et al. (2012) 
find that perceived benefit of a new installation had the greatest effect on 
acceptability. This is one of the reasons to why opposition to transmission 
projects is particularly difficult to address and why the experience from single 
location facilities is of limited usefulness. Part of the difficulty in addressing 
the stakeholder conflicts in grid developments lie in the challenge to define, 
measure and compensate communities for their environmental impacts. The 
benefits of most infrastructure facilities are spread across the economy, whilst 
much of their adverse impacts tend to be local. This is also the case with energy 
generation plants. 
 
However, for energy generation plants the capacities and outputs, and 
therefore the benefits, are more easily measurable in both physical and 
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monetary terms. Meanwhile, the large geographic span of linear 
infrastructures often affects multiple communities rather than a single host 
community. Also, due to the complex design and technical nature of the grid, 
the system benefits associated with an incremental network expansion or 
enhancement project can be difficult to estimate. As such, local communities 
perceive the benefits of a transmission line as limited, thus intensifying 
conflicts.  
 
4.3.2 The need for a new approach to grid conflicts 
Although there are some shared characteristics with other energy facilities, 
the technical and economic features of transmission grid projects are different 
in several respects and thus require specific solutions. For instance, measuring 
the relevant output of an incremental new line for compensation and benefit 
sharing is considerably more complicated. Also, electricity transmission 
networks are natural monopolies and require economic regulation. 
 
New grid projects are ultimately financed by electricity consumers through 
transmission fees collected on electricity bills. Thus, increasing the project 
costs through either undergrounding lines or paying compensation is borne 
by all electricity users across the country. In terms of land-use, transmission 
lines are linear infrastructures, covering great stretches of land, thus affecting 
many stakeholders, types of land, land uses, and sensitive areas. Additionally, 
the physical features of networks complicate matters further as a change in 
one part of the network will also have an effect on the rest of the system. 
Consequently, specific benefits of grid upgrades are difficult to identify, 
quantify, and allocate. Rather than confined benefits of a single line, any 
upgrade benefits the reliability and security of the network as a whole. 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the main insights from recent research and the economic 
characteristics of grid developments. The figure shows the key dimensions and 
features of community engagement when implementing a new grid project. On 
the one hand, issues related to private goods with few stakeholders are 
considered. In these cases, decisions tend to be based on individual 
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preferences, choice and rationale. On the other hand, decisions regarding the 
issues related to public goods tend to consider social level interests and 
rationale. 
 
Figure 4.1. Dimensions of community engagement 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Vatn (2005, 419) 
 
The figure identifies two different approaches to community engagement with 
grid projects. Goods, which have private ownership and entitlement, can be 
considered on an individual level as they involve few stakeholders. Issues on 
an individual level may therefore be managed through an instrumental 
approach. The term instrumental refers to a set framework that can be applied 
in a similar way in different situations without much modification. This is the 
current approach for offering compensation to landowners for structures such 
as pylons that are placed on their land, for example, through offering a fixed 
amount per pylon or a wind turbine, dependent on its size or alternatively on 
its energy produced or transmitted. 
 
Conversely, goods which are public in nature and entitlement, and thus must 
be considered on a social level, i.e., involve many stakeholders, require a 
collective negotiation approach. When the number of stakeholders is high, and 
Type of good 
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a decision will affect large groups, the importance of communication increases, 
especially two-way negotiations. As illustrated by the figure, communication 
on a collective level is the approach that could be adopted in engagement with 
communities. This is however seldom the case, giving rise to conflicts (RGI, 
2012). 
 
In order to increase public trust, reduce stakeholder conflicts, and encourage 
acceptance of new grid developments, recent research suggests better 
information provision and more emphasis on communication and community 
involvement at an earlier stage and in a more deliberative planning process 
(RGI, 2012; Newig and Kvarda, 2012; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2012; CSE, 
2009). Additionally, Ciupuliga and Cuppen (2013) highlight the role of 
dialogue in the planning process, which is argued to not only improve the 
potential to reach agreement but also benefit the project through the access to 
local knowledge and insights. 
 
The lessons emerging from the above-mentioned cases and similar projects 
suggest that they share some key features. Such conflicts are often treated on 
an ad hoc basis whilst trust and perceived procedural justice of the process is 
generally low. The conflicts are often treated as planning and financial 
compensation matters while sustainability and citizenship aspects are often 
the root cause of the conflicts. For example, financial arrangements such as 
compensations and benefit sharing schemes have been suggested as practical 
measures to redistribute the costs and benefits of large projects in order to 
make the outcome of decision-making more socially acceptable and 
economically efficient.  
 
An important issue with a purely monetary approach is that it fails to take into 
account the broader range of reasons behind community opposition. 
Therefore, a broader theory-informed approach and conceptualisation of 
community engagement with grid projects is needed to devise structure and 
more effective solutions to resolve them (Been, 1993). 
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4.4 Towards a Sustainable Grid Development Approach 
 
4.4.1 Financial compensation and benefit provision 
A common measure to assist the siting of locally unwanted facilities, which has 
long been the focus of particularly economic researchers, is that of monetary 
compensation to prospective host communities. This notion was first 
introduced by O’Hare (1977), declaring it to be necessary for an efficient siting 
process. More recently, Lesbirel (1998) find compensation to positively 
facilitate the siting of energy plants in Japan while McAdam et al. (2010) argues 
that failing to compensate the host country of a pipeline is linked to mobilised 
opposition. 
 
Community compensation through financial arrangements can in principal be 
in the form of (i) one-off lump sum payments, (ii) a stream of payments; or (iii) 
some form of part-ownership. Alternatively, the developers can offer direct 
investments in the community such as infrastructural upgrades (e.g., new and 
better roads, increased connectivity such as fibre optic broadband) or other 
benefits such as tax reductions or reduced energy prices.  
 
Lump sum payments involve one-off payments to a community fund when the 
project starts operating. Assuming good management and careful investment 
the fund could generate continued income. Alternatively, a developer may 
offer annual payments. In wind power developments in the UK this is normally 
per megawatt (e.g., £5,000 per MW), linked to the generation capacity, energy 
output of the project, or a fraction of the revenues generated (CSE, 2009). As 
mentioned, given the nature of transmission development projects, the output 
and added benefits of a new line are difficult to determine rendering such 
measures difficult to implement. Instead a less direct option could be to link 
the size of compensation to total investments, number of pylons, or perhaps 
per km of grid length. 
 
A share in the project can either be provided as a form of compensation from 
the developer or acquired as an investment (CSE, 2009). In a study conducted 
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in Scotland, Warren and McFadyen (2010) find that local ownership may have 
a positive effect on public attitudes towards wind farms. Allan et al. (2011) 
suggests that local community ownership and thus local retention of profits 
increase the economic impact of wind farms. However, direct application of 
the instruments used in wind power developments for transmission lines is 
difficult. For a regulated industry, where profits are generally earned through 
return on assets rather than through market operation, the nature of the risks 
is different. Additionally, the deposition of the electricity grid and dependency 
with other parts of the network make it difficult to integrate community 
ownership of one or part of a transmission line. 
 
However, offering financial compensation is not a one size fits all solution. Frey 
et al. (1996) argues that offering compensation to prospective host 
communities will have a negative effect on acceptance and Kunreuther and 
Easterling (1990) and Oberholzer-Gee et al. (1995), find no link between 
financial compensation and efficient siting and local approval of nuclear-waste 
repositories. Instead, the perception of compensation as a bribe and the 
crowding out of the feeling of civic duty can increase the opposition to the 
project. This was shown to be the case in a Swiss study where the rate of 
community acceptance of a nuclear-waste repository was found to decline, 
from 50.8 to 24.6%, when compensation was offered compared to when no 
compensation was offered (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). Similarly, in a 
study on new overhead line construction, Simora (2017) find financial 
compensation to diminish willingness to accept proposed projects. 
  
As a result, rather than using direct financial compensation, Frey et al. (1996) 
suggests that in-kind compensation, intended to benefit the community as a 
whole, weakens the bribe effect and thus supports the siting process of locally 
unwanted projects. An example of local benefit sharing is the provision of 
‘Community Benefit Schemes’. Such sharing schemes, which may contain 
“good-will” gestures, such as upgrading a road or a new playground, to 
financial arrangements, such as payments to a community fund or community 
ownership, have proven effective in increasing local support for wind power 
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developments. This is particularly the case in countries such as Denmark and 
Spain, where local ownership, and thus greater local retention of profits, are 
more common (CSE, 2009; Warren and McFadyen, 2010; Allan et al., 2011). 
However, UK communities remain unconvinced of the intentions behind the 
benefit provision with many still considering it as a method to silent 
opposition with bribes (Cass et al., 2010). Even well-intentioned developers 
seldom receive the trust of local communities, which may be partially due to 
the timing of the offered compensation (Aitken, 2010). 
 
4.4.2 A property rights view of grid development 
While the communities affected by grid development may oppose the projects, 
the nature of the community claim on the local environment needs some 
consideration. The affected communities (apart from landowners) do not 
normally have a private ownership right to the landscape in question. 
Nevertheless, they have the right to the use of their immediate natural 
environment along with the general public.  
 
However, if a community have enjoyed the benefits of a public good, such as a 
landscape or scenery, over time, a right to use may come to be perceived as 
actual ownership entitlement or right to these (Silberstein and Maser, 2000).10 
Formation of entitlement or rights is common and also occurs in the case of 
subsidies, licences, or quotas that are awarded and renewed over long periods 
of time. A community can assume or behave as having a property right or 
private entitlement to local aspects of public goods adversely affected by grid 
projects and thus the perception of entitlement to property or user rights 
becomes a central, though subtle, aspect of the opposition to the project. 
 
Using a property rights view, we can consider a simple community 
compensation payment or benefit receipt to reach a resolution. In order to 
construct a new transmission line, there are two technical options: An 
overground line at cost (A) or, a more costly partially undergrounded cable at 
 
10  Note that this view of entitlement and benefit is purely from an economic perspective, 
opinions of other fields of research, such as environmental phycology, would no doubt differ. 
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cost (B). The cost difference between the two options is thus (B-A) and 
undergrounding is assumed to achieve project acceptance.11  If the general 
public holds the property rights to the affected landscape, the local 
communities can be thought as having a willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid the 
project. This WTP will be equal to (B-A) and to the willingness to accept (WTA) 
of the general public (or network utility). Both actors will be indifferent 
between the two options given that the project costs will remain the same. 
 
Alternatively, the property rights to the landscape can be allocated to the 
affected local communities. 12  In this case, the community can accept the 
project through a WTA mechanism. In this case, the society or the developer 
will have a maximum WTP that is equal to the cost difference between the 
underground and overground options (B-A), which is also equal to the 
maximum WTA the communities can achieve. If the communities demand 
more than (B-A) they will receive nothing as the developer will choose to 
underground the line. 
 
Following Coase (1960), the outcomes of the above two cases are equal in 
terms of economic efficiency as the WTA and WTP will be equal to (B-A). 
However, depending on the initial allocation of property rights, the 
distributional effects and the actual or perceived equity implications are 
significant and crucial from a political economy point of view. For example, the 
former case may be perceived as being unfair that the communities should be 
expected to pay off the wider society in order to avoid the negative impact of 
the project or have the line placed underground. 
 
Theoretically, WTA and WTP are assumed to be equal. However, experimental 
evidence suggests that WTA is usually greater than WTP (Horowitz and 
McConnell, 2002). Following the example above, we have two potential 
outcomes. Independent of if the property right lies with the community or the 
 
11  Although this may not be a realistic assumption in real world situations we use this 
simplified view to illustrate our example. 
12 Note that transmission lines may affect other than local residents although not captured by 
this approach. 
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developer, if WTP is higher or equal to the cost of undergrounding, the project 
will go ahead and placed underground. If, however, the cost of undergrounding 
the line is greater than the WTP, the project will not be realised. Again, the 
implications in terms of social and distributional point of view are significantly 
different and will affect the manner in which the project will be perceived.  
 
4.4.3 An environmental sustainability approach to grid development 
The economic approaches to community engagement in grid development 
based on individual or collective compensation, benefit sharing, and property 
rights allocation can help reduce community opposition to grid development 
projects. However, these approaches have, on their own, methodological and 
practical shortcomings. The main limitation is related to that of identification 
as well as the lack of clear property rights and assignment of such rights in the 
absence of clear entitlement to these. In addition, although such approaches 
could help reduce the level of conflict, they may not necessarily be desirable 
from an environmental sustainability point of view as they are generally short-
term approaches without a sustainability and intertemporal rationale. 
Therefore, the above economic instruments can be more effective when used 
within a high-level environmental strategy that links the individual and 
community interests to an overarching social policy and public decision rule 
and process (see Cain and Nelson, 2013). Given the above reasoning, we 
propose an economics informed environmental sustainability approach as the 
basis for a coherent and comprehensive decision framework. 
 
This alternative economic approach can be explored based around the concept 
of environmental sustainability and the related notion of intergenerational 
equity. Sustainability in this context can be considered as the ability to meet 
the needs of the present without compromising the needs of future 
generations. It is the continued capacity to engage in certain activities. Within 
this perspective, the adverse environmental effects of grid projects can be 
viewed in terms of transformation of natural assets from one form to another. 
As first suggested by Hartwick (1977) and Solow (1986), the total value of a 
non-renewable environmental resource can be preserved over time by 
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investing or transforming the benefits or rents from the use of a natural 
resource into other assets. This transformation can be in the form of strong or 
weak sustainability. 
 
In a strong sustainability viewpoint, the total value of a resource or natural 
asset is to be maintained for current and future generations if an equivalent 
value of environmental asset can be created from the rents. This can, for 
example, be part of an ecological strategy which attempts to preserve 
ecosystem services. On the other hand, within a weak sustainability view, 
some form of financial or social capital (in this case perhaps community 
capital) of the same value can be created from the benefits of the project. Other 
possibilities such as transforming the natural asset into physical or human 
capital can also exist in the spectrum of sustainability options (Ayres et al., 
1998; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007). Weak sustainability draws on the notion 
that environmental problems are caused by inefficient use of natural 
resources. By monetising externalities (caused by inefficiencies) the costs can 
be internalised and a solution devised. The economic rent from a project 
would be redistributed and social costs would equal to private costs. Practical 
examples of weak sustainability policy include the sovereign funds in resource 
rich countries, such as Norway who uses the Norwegian Petroleum Fund to 
invest part of their proceeds from oil extraction in the North Sea in financial 
assets.  
 
The environmental impact of a grid development can be viewed in terms of 
weak and strong sustainability. If a grid development project is deemed to 
produce a net socio-economic surplus this implies the project can compensate 
for the environmental damage of the project. This compensation can be in the 
form of creating an equivalent benefit or value elsewhere. Within this 
framework, the wider society as a whole must decide on the acceptable form 
of the transformation and conversion of the value of the natural assets affected 
by grid development while preserving their total value – i.e., whether the 
natural asset affected should be transformed into another natural asset or into 
physical, financial, social, or human capital. This decision should be part of a 
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high level and long-term sustainability strategy that informs the decision-
making framework, rules, and processes. 
 
From compensation and benefit sharing to community investment  
Compensation of a public nature can be perceived to be fairer and more honest 
compared to individual monetary compensation and is thus more likely to be 
successful (Terwel et al., 2014: Frey et al., 1996). However, grid projects have 
lasting inter-temporal environmental impacts. A weakness of ad hoc and 
narrow approaches based on compensation and benefit sharing is that they 
may result in one-off short-term solutions and settlements that do not ensure 
dynamic and inter-generational equity. Therefore, preserving the value of an 
environmental asset will often require investment in other assets that produce 
sustainable long-term benefits.  
 
It is, in principal, possible for the society to adhere to a strong or weak 
sustainability criterion and create ‘community capital’ through ‘community 
investments’ in another form of capital. For example, the Beauly-Denny 
transmission line project had an element of both strong and weak 
sustainability; the developers were required to improve the environment 
along certain sections beyond the effect of the new line and in two cases they 
were also required to provide financial compensation to affected 
communities.13 
 
Assigning compensation to individual members of a community is impractical 
as the transaction costs would increase significantly with allocating individual 
compensation rights. Also, the task of identifying who is entitled to 
compensation is difficult as there are often no defined criteria. Proximity to 
the new line may seem an obvious measure – for example, Sims and Dent 
(2005) find that proximity to a transmission line lowers property prices, and 
Gibbons (2015) suggests similar results with regards to wind power 
developments. However, where the dividing lines for compensation should be 
 
13 This additional cost was approved by Ofgem, the GB energy regulator, as it was a condition 
of the consent from the Scottish ministers. 
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drawn is difficult. A more suitable approach is therefore to aggregate 
compensations and the method agreed on through collective negotiations on 
a society-wide level. 
 
Community investment through collective negotiation 
Offering investments in community infrastructure or services is common in 
wind power developments, often labelled as ‘community benefits’. Upgrading 
roads or recreational spaces gives a developer the opportunity to work 
directly with the community. Transmission developments involve several 
communities (rather than one host community as in the case of energy 
generation facilities) and each community has specific needs that can be 
identified through participation in the planning process and addressed when 
developing the compensatory approach. Furthermore, by encouraging the 
stakeholders to reveal private information about their preferences, 
negotiations between the developer and the community about the level and 
type of compensation can increase social welfare. Here, the concepts of weak 
and strong sustainability can act as a starting point and guide the negotiations 
on how the environmental costs of a development are to be allocated and how 
the rents from it may be redistributed. 
 
Oberholzer-Gee et al. (1995) find that granting authority to affected 
communities and two-way negotiations, thus customer and public 
participation in the planning process, increases local approval of the facilities. 
Such negotiation will open for innovative solutions that would not have been 
envisaged by policy makers and developers as local knowledge and needs is 
utilised, thus increasing the efficiency and welfare effect of the outcome 
(Doucet and Littlechild, 2006; Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013). This is further 
emphasized by Kunreuther and Easterling (1996), arguing the case for a 
voluntary siting process and negotiated compensation, rather than using 
predetermined compensation measures without community influence. 
 
As a complement to traditional regulatory approaches, some regulators in 
North America have used negotiated settlements between grid utilities and 
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their customers to determine cost, price and operating projections. Negotiated 
settlements have proved to limit the regulatory workload, decreasing delays 
and increase efficiency (Doucet and Littlechild, 2006). Nevertheless, consumer 
engagement is a new concept to electricity grid owners, particularly the 
transmission grid given its role within the electricity system. Challenges 
related to low levels of knowledge of the public related to what transmission 
developments entail and their need will be an issue and risks network 
companies benefitting from informational and bargaining advantage. 
 
Voluntary agreements (VAs) between environmental regulators and polluting 
firms have become an increasingly popular policy instrument to ensure the 
protection of environmental quality. VAs are seen as an alternative to 
mandatory approaches based on regulation or legislation with a wide range of 
applications including water pollution, air pollution, and waste management 
(Segerson and Miceli, 1998). The European Commission (1996) identify three 
main potential advantages of VAs: i, the encouragement of a pro-active 
cooperative approach from industry, which can reduce conflicts with 
regulators, ii, greater flexibility and freedom to find cost-effective solutions 
that are tailored to specific solutions, and iii, the ability to reach solutions more 
quickly due to reduced negotiation and implementation lags. This implies 
possible reduced compliance, administrative and other transaction costs. 
However, Segerson and Miceli (1998) find that VAs could reduce 
environmental quality compared to stricter legislation and Lyon and Maxwell 
(2003) find that VAs are more likely in situations where industry display 
strong resistance to stricter regulatory and legislative measures, risking less 
socially optimal outcomes. Furthermore, VAs are argued to be more efficient 
and effective in the existence of a strong regulatory threat, that is, in situations 
where the regulator display strong bargaining power (Alberini and Segerson, 
2002). As a result, whilst collective negotiation can increase cooperation, 
reduce transaction costs and lead to efficient results, the regulator or other 
governing body must be in a position of strong bargaining power with the 
ability to impose decisions in case of negotiation breakdowns. This is 
particularly important if the number of stakeholders is high, as is in 
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transmission developments. Compensating and negotiating with the 
communities rather than individual members of the public reduces the 
transaction costs as the number of participants in negotiations is reduced. 
Nevertheless, negotiations risk the possibility of a breakdown if the parties fail 
to reach an agreement. In order to reduce the probability of unsuccessful 
negotiations, an independent authority such as the sector regulator could step 
in as mediator, which will intervene in case that no agreement is reached. It is, 
however, in the interest of both parties to reach an agreement as, in case of 
failure to agree, the regulator can impose a socio-economically less favourable 
outcome (Doucet and Littlechild, 2006). Appointing an ultimate decision 
maker and arbitrator also limits the appeal of hold up as it is less likely that 
one party to negotiations can delay the process through rent seeking 
behaviour. 
 
Menu of options method for collective negotiations  
At the presence of uncertainty and information asymmetry it is difficult to 
form and maintain robust principal-agent relationships. The transaction costs 
are higher in negotiations, leading to inefficient outcomes. In regulatory 
economics, the use of a menu of options or contracts is expected to reduce the 
effect of uncertainty and information asymmetry (Laffont and Tirole, 1986; 
Laffont, 1993). Keeping consumer welfare constant, the regulator can offer the 
firm a choice of different regulatory contracts, which essentially consist of 
different combinations of cost sharing provisions (a fixed component and a 
component dependent on the responsiveness of the firm’s revenues to costs). 
The firm will choose the optimising contract depending on its cost 
opportunities (Joskow, 2007). Pareto improvements are possible since 
consumer welfare is kept constant and firms can increase their welfare due to 
the flexibility to choose an optimising contract based on private firm 
information which was previously unknown by the regulator (Crew and 
Kleindorfer, 1992). 
 
A menu of contracts can thus be used in order to elicit information and 
increase efficiency. Drawing on the theory of economic regulation, a similar 
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approach may be developed to optimize the provision of sustainability-based 
compensations for transmission grid projects. In this, the developer offers the 
affected community a set of compensatory measures. The cost of different 
alternatives can be held constant at a reference cost, for example in the above 
case at the difference between the cost of an overhead line and an 
underground cable. Given the knowledge in terms of different compensatory 
options, a menu of options may, for example, consist of choices between 
community fund payments, infrastructure developments, community 
ownership, and environmental investments. 
 
By providing a menu of options, the communities can choose among a set of 
sustainable solutions that maximizes their welfare depending on their 
attributes and value to the community. This self-selecting process is preferable 
since choosing one contract or option is the equivalent of revealing internal 
information, which would otherwise remain unknown. Thus, the process is 
more efficient than if the developer or the government were to design and 
implement a policy without consulting the community through collective 
negotiation within a sustainability framework. 
 
4.5. Conclusions 
The electricity networks need to upgrade and expand in order to meet the 
future demands of the sector, including connecting smaller but numerous 
conventional and renewable generation facilities. However, many new 
transmission lines are facing opposition from the affected local communities 
on the grounds of their environmental, social and possible economic impacts. 
The conflicts cause delays and prolong planning thus adding to the project 
costs and foregone system benefits. The conventional decision approaches 
seem unable to resolve many of the conflicts. There is therefore a need for a 
new approach to address the community opposition to grid development 
projects. 
 
In this chapter we discussed direct compensation and benefit sharing 
methods, as well as property rights approaches and how these measures can 
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play a role in reducing community opposition to grid development. However, 
these methods currently lack an overarching theoretical and methodological 
framework to structure and guide the process, which is important for gaining 
the trust and acceptance of communities and society as a whole. Additionally, 
methods based on purely compensatory measures are not devised to allow for 
public and local participation in the planning process and therefore fail to 
address the underlying causes of opposition. 
 
We suggest a socio-economic approach to grid development that is based on 
the concepts of weak and strong sustainability and that the environment 
affected by grid developments, rather than the community per se, can be 
compensated within a sustainability approach. It is however ultimately for the 
larger society to decide, through public and social policy decision framework, 
on the nature of the compensation along the spectrum of weak to strong 
sustainability options – e.g., in the form of lasting investments in 
environmental, physical, financial, social, or human capital. This compensation 
can, to an agreed upon extent, accrue to the affected communities; although it 
is up to the society decide on how and on the level. While financial 
compensations appeal to the consumer dimension of communities and 
members as economic agents, compensation in the form of environmental 
assets appeals to the citizenship dimension of these. 
 
The suggested mechanism can be in the form of collective negotiations 
between the communities and developer with the consent of the regulator and 
policy makers. Collective negotiations ensure that stakeholders are better able 
to participate in the decision-making framework. The efficiency and 
acceptance of the outcome of collective negotiations can then be further 
improved through the use of a menu of options, an established concept in 
regulatory economics.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Public Engagement in Electricity Network 
Development: The Case of the Beauly–Denny Project 
in Scotland 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The future of energy networks holds important technical, economic, and social 
challenges. Across Europe, the electricity grids are in need of modernisation to 
support the on-going development of low carbon energy systems. In order to 
connect the large number of emerging renewable energy plants and 
integration of energy markets the networks need to expand. This is true 
regarding both distribution and transmission networks.14 Meanwhile, larger 
development projects such as expansion of transmission networks tend to 
dominate the public debate, much due to their greater impact in terms of 
national importance, economic costs, environmental impacts, as well as their 
potentially negative effect on neighbouring communities. 
 
Network developers, traditionally this would be monopolistic transmission 
owners (TOs), face a number of constraints which may extend planning 
processes and delay projects – considering alternative project designs, 
negotiations with the regulator to justify the need case and cost efficiency, 
environmental constraints which will have to be considered, or a change in 
government policy – are a few of the potential issues. The focus of this chapter 
is on public and community opposition and, although not a new issue, it is 
proving to be an increasingly important aspect in planning and development 
of grid projects. It is an indication that the role of electricity consumers is 
changing and that energy companies are slow to react.  
 
14 The development of distributed generation sources and demand for electric vehicles, among 
others, is exerting pressure on the distribution networks to take on a new role as active 
networks compared to a previously passive role (Poudineh et al., 2015). 
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Objections to large projects often relate to environmental, visual and health 
aspects (Soini et al., 2011), particularly from communities in close proximity 
to a planned development. Failure to agree between stakeholders leads to 
costly delays or even causes projects to be abandoned altogether. As a result, 
the potential for reaching the targets set for reducing carbon emissions and 
climate change, thus a green energy future, is in jeopardy (European 
Commission, 2008). 
 
Grid development projects tend to affect a number of stakeholders – from state 
and local communities to NGOs, landowners and corporations – each with 
different objectives and perceptions of the project and surrounding matters. 
The existing decision-making processes and institutions have proven 
ineffective at resettling conflicts that appear between stakeholders, causing 
uncertainty and delays. Increased information provision and public 
engagement in transmission grid planning can increase public trust in network 
companies, public acceptance and therefore accelerate the realisation of new 
grid developments (RGI, 2012; Newig and Kvarda, 2012; Cotton and Devine-
Wright, 2010). The Aarhus Convention (European Community signed and 
implemented in 1998 and 2003 respectively) advocates early and effective 
public participation to increase the transparency of the planning and decision-
making process.  
 
Public engagement implies the involvement of members of the public in policy-
forming and policy development. The concept is not new but is becoming 
increasingly important in infrastructural developments. For example, in 2010 
a United Nations legal tribunal found that the UK government had failed to 
provide sufficient information and decision-making powers to the public 
regarding two major wind developments (UN, 2010).  
 
However, despite the pressure through the Aarhus Convention and elsewhere 
there are no established guidelines, rules or frameworks defining how public 
participation ought to be formalised. Recent high-profile projects, such as the 
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Norwegian Hardanger line and the Scottish Beauly-Denny line15, show that 
transmission projects increasingly involve vested social, economic and 
political interests. Noticeably, there is a need for new approaches for defining 
and organising the role and tasks of the actors, including the public and 
affected communities. 
 
Exploring project characteristics and stakeholder relations using an economic 
approach is previously untested in transmission developments but it can 
potentially generate several efficiency improvements. Based on the seminal 
works by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1979) on the role of institutions, 
rules, and norms, this chapter analyses economic characteristics of 
transmission projects following a New Institutional Economics approach. 
Additionally, using the contentious Beauly-Denny High Voltage transmission 
line project and input from previous literature, this chapter outlines how 
public engagement may be approached to allow for a more efficient planning 
process. Personal interviews with representatives from TOs, government and 
affected communities inform the assessment and provide a novel perspective. 
 
The Beauly-Denny project is a representative example for current issues and 
developments within the energy sector; its need is driven by government 
policy to meet climate change targets, a more active public and stakeholder 
base with over 20,000 objections indicates the changing role for consumers, 
and sluggish response from the governing frameworks, including regulatory, 
legislative, planning and decision-making. 
 
This chapter is outlined as follows: Section 5.2 applies the economic theory to 
the practical issues, including the economic characteristics of transmission 
developments and public engagement. Section 5.3 presents and assesses the 
Beauly-Denny transmission line development with a critical discussion on the 
treatment of consumers and public engagement. Section 5.4 concludes. 
 
15 The Hardanger transmission line crossing the Hardanger fjord on the Norwegian west coast, 
was one of the most reported news stories in Norway in 2010. The Beauly-Denny transmission 
line received over 20,000 objections and was covered extensively by UK media. 
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5.2 Theoretical application 
 
5.2.1 Economic characteristics of transmission developments 
The integration of high levels of renewable energy sources in electricity 
systems and having effective market competition in wholesale electricity 
generation both require substantial investments in new and upgraded 
transmission networks. At the same time, transmission grid is a natural 
monopoly function and is, as a result, subject to economic regulation and 
oversight by the sector regulator (Biggar and Hesamzadeh, 2014). In practice, 
this means that over-spending or disallowed investments on new grid projects 
will reduce the revenues and profits of the network utilities (Joskow, 2008). 
The technical nature of the transmission networks means that determining the 
operational and economic benefits of the grid projects can often be complex 
(see, e.g., Volk, 2013; Brattle Group, 2013). 
 
Transmission lines are essentially electricity highways with the purpose to 
transport electricity, for example, from an area rich in resources to another 
where demand outweighs supply. Areas at either end of a transmission line 
can enjoy benefits from new installations, including revenues from energy 
production, reduced electricity prices and a more reliable service. However, 
the benefits to the areas along the lines are less obvious. Connecting renewable 
energy sources and reliable networks benefit the country as a whole, yet 
potential costs of reduced property prices, visual amenity, tourism and 
damages to wildlife are mainly borne by communities along the line. These 
costs are not easily quantified as they can either be labelled as public goods or 
they are not directly observable. Thus, the construction of new transmission 
lines produce externalities as the local social costs are greater than the private 
costs. 
 
The planning process of grid developments is highly specific and depends on 
the knowledge and experience of developers, consumers, and authorities. 
Reaching unanimous decisions in transmission developments is difficult as the 
physical and financial size of projects, as well as the number of stakeholders, 
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tend to make cooperation difficult. Public knowledge regarding electricity 
networks relate largely to technical aspects, such as pylons and wires, rather 
than their organisations (Devine-Wright et al., 2010). The low level of public 
knowledge regarding transmission line development and administration is 
not only a cause of increased public opposition to new grid projects, it also 
restricts increased public participation and a more active role for communities 
within the development process. 
 
Another aspect is the large number of affected communities and citizens along 
the transmission lines. Although all stakeholders should have the chance to 
express their views and perspectives towards a project, it would be impossible 
to consider all statements and objections. The Beauly-Denny project alone 
received over 20,000 objections. The developer and planning authority must 
balance the public’s views to be taken into account and the wider benefits of 
acceleration of developments. 
 
5.2.2 Economic characteristics of public engagement 
Public engagement is defined as the practice of involving members of the 
public in policy-forming and decision-making activities of organisations 
responsible for policy development. Depending on the flow of information 
between the participating public and the responsible organisation, public 
engagement is divided into (i) public communication; (ii) public consultation; 
and (iii) public participation. Public communication relates to a one-way 
information flow from the organisation to the public whilst public consultation 
considers a flow of information from the public to the organisation. In public 
participation, a formal dialogue takes place and information is exchanged 
between members of the public and the organisation (Rowe and Frewer, 
2005). Public engagement is therefore considered in policy and decision-
making frameworks only if initiated by the responsible organisation. However, 
the extent to which public engagement is allowed to influence the process is 
often unclear. 
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Newig (2007) notes that the rationale for public participation in sustainable 
environmental planning includes access to local knowledge, attitudes and 
acceptance, increased awareness, transparency and, thus, trust between 
stakeholders. If properly framed, some of the lessons from environmental 
planning could be used to address the opposition to and conflicts in grid 
development projects. Given the similarities between sustainable 
environmental planning and the characteristics of the energy sector, e.g. 
multiple stakeholders, public goods and market failure, instruments of 
environmental governance and policy analysis such as cost-effectiveness and 
social and environmental cost-benefit analysis are also applicable to 
transmission developments (Think, 2013; LIFE Elia, 2015).  
 
Public and community engagement in power line projects shares some 
features with that of other major infrastructure developments. Such 
engagements have often been discussed in the literature in the context of 
specific types of projects: for example, nuclear power plants (Otway et al., 
1978), in the context of carbon capture and storage (Kraeusel and Möst, 2012), 
wind power (e.g., Swofford and Slattery, 2010) or airports (e.g., Jue et al., 
1984). Recent large-scale grid projects like the Beauly-Denny transmission 
line however show that the public takes an increasing role in the realisation 
and success of these projects. 
 
5.3 The Beauly-Denny Transmission Project 
 
5.3.1 Background 
There are two main TOs in Scotland: Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission Ltd 
(SHETL), a subsidiary of Scottish and Southern Energy plc (SSE), and Scottish 
Power Transmission Ltd (SPT), a subsidiary of SP Energy Networks. Scotland’s 
energy policy is devolved from the UK government, and therefore 
independently decides on consents for developments of energy 
infrastructures. However, the GB wide energy regulator Ofgem regulates the 
TOs in Scotland and National Grid operates the whole GB system whilst 
owning the transmission network in England and Wales. 
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The Scottish and UK government targets of tackling climate change have 
prompted an increase of renewable energy generation. The existing 
transmission capacity is insufficient to allow the intended renewable energy 
facilities to connect to the network. As part of their transmission licences, 
SHETL and SPL maintain that they have a duty under the Electricity Act 1989 
to develop and maintain an efficient, co-ordinated and economical system of 
electricity transmission. This is to facilitate competition in supply and 
generation of electricity. The Beauly-Denny line was argued to be a key 
infrastructural development towards maintaining competition and enable 
development of renewable energy.  
 
5.3.2 Beauly-Denny project facts 
The Beauly-Denny High Voltage Transmission Line (HVTL) is a high profile 
development, subject to the longest ever public inquiry in Scotland. It has been 
followed closely in media and has generated close to 20,000 objections from 
all over the world. The planning process has taken ten years from the initial 
identification of the need for the project to the start of construction. Applying 
the theoretical concepts outlined in Section 5.2, i.e. transaction costs, 
information asymmetry, and principal-agent relationships, this case study will 
focus on how consumer engagement was managed in the Beauly-Denny 
planning process. The project is an example of how conflicting interests of the 
stakeholders delay the execution of projects and reveals a lack of suitable a 
decision-making framework for such developments. The study is based on 
first-hand information collected through interviews with key stakeholders 
and an extensive research and collection of information published by all the 
relevant stakeholders.  
 
In September 2005, SHETL and SPT applied for planning consent under 
Section 37 of the Electricity Act 1989 to construct a new high voltage power-
line between Beauly, near Inverness, and Denny, near Stirling. The project 
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involves the construction of a 220 kilometres 16  long 400kV double circuit 
overhead transmission line set to replace the current single circuit 132kV 
transmission line, which will be dismantled as part of the development. One 
circuit will operate at a voltage of 400kV and the other at 275kV. Further 
expansion and construction of substations will also take place. Approximately 
600 steel pylons between 43 and 65m tall will support the line, although the 
majority of towers are between 50 and 56 meters tall. The spacing of towers 
are dependent on topography, altitude and the exposure of weather effects, 
such as high winds, but will normally vary in a range of 275 to 450m and they 
will be fixed in the ground using concrete tower foundations (SSE, 2012a; SSE, 
2012b). The Beauly-Denny project was completed and the line went live in 
November 2015. 
 
The new power-line mainly follows the same route as the old 132kV line, 
however changes in the use of land in the course of time required slight 
deviations (Figure 5.1 illustrates the new route in relation to the old route). 
The 220km long stretch is divided into four sections, separated by the new 
substations. The landscape along the line is characterised by varying land uses 
including remote moorland, forests, river valleys, roads (A9) and some more 
populated areas 17 . The routing around the Stirling area was particularly 
contentious as the power-line passes close to residential areas and near 
Stirling’s most famous tourist attractions: Stirling Castle and the Wallace 
monument. Following the longest public inquiry in Scotland, Scottish Ministers 
gave consent to the construction in 2010, provided that certain mitigation 
measures were adapted. SPT worked with Stirling council to reach agreement 
on an appropriate mitigation scheme and the final consent was given in 
December 2011 and construction commenced in February 201218.  
  
 
16 SHETL is responsible for 200km and SPT is responsible for 20km. 
17 See Appendix 5.1 for a more detailed outline.  
18 See Appendix 5.2 for a project timeline. 
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Figure 5.1: Overview of the Beauly-Denny power-line routing. 
 
  
Source: Used with the permission of SSE 
(2012b) 
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Strategic options 
Several strategic options for routing of the corridors and alternatives for 
achieving the required transmission capacity were considered at the initial 
stage of planning. The identification of a number of plausible routes was 
followed by a more detailed analysis of technical, economic and environmental 
aspects. The environmental evaluation followed the guidelines of the Holford 
Rules 19  and aimed to achieve the best fit within the landscape, balancing 
minimal effects on sensitive landscapes with the requirement of keeping 
alignments more than 100m from residential buildings.  
 
A public consultation was exercised once an ‘optimal’ route was identified. 
Undergrounding of the line was considered at early stages of the project. 
Although undergrounding the line or sections of it would reduce potential 
visual or health effects, it will still have a significant environmental impact. 
SHETL states that a 25m wide corridor of land would be cleared in order to 
position the power-line. Such a corridor would be needed to remain clear after 
construction to allow for future access for maintenance and upgrading of the 
line (SSE, 2012b). National Grid (2009) estimates that, using modern cable 
technics, undergrounding a typical 400kV double circuit power-line will cost 
12 to 17 times as much as installing the same line overhead. This is mainly due 
to the differences in the cables themselves, the insulation of underground 
cables and the construction method itself. 
 
5.3.3 Stakeholders and their objectives 
The difficulty in any major infrastructural development is to strike a balance 
between the long-term objectives of the various stakeholders and the overall 
benefits of the development. The complex nature of the planning process is 
largely due to conflicting interests, information asymmetry and the various 
principal-agent relationships amongst the vast range of stakeholders. Such 
conflicts occasion transaction costs, further increasing the externalities of 
 
19 Guidelines for the construction of new high voltage overhead transmission lines. These 
include the notions of avoiding major areas of high amenity value, areas of scientific interests, 
choosing the most direct route and a preference for tree and hill backgrounds rather than sky 
(National Grid, 2012). 
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projects. This section outlines the participants’ differing practical roles in the 
planning process and discusses the theoretical underpinnings, characteristics 
and incentives relative to the varied range of stakeholders. The focus is on the 
process in Scotland; however the theoretical aspects, characteristics and 
incentives are not country specific.  
 
The Scottish Government 
The Scottish government belongs to the public sector. The public sector is 
characterised by a multiplicity of dimensions regarding tasks, stakeholders 
and conflicting interests. A multitude of principal-agent relationships arise 
from dealings related to both distributive and allocative issues. Governments 
generally set out to maximise welfare rather than profits and therefore often 
fail to minimise costs and maximise economic value (Libecap, 1989). In 
particular, compared to the private sector, incentives for efficiency in the 
public sector are rather weak due to the absence of competitive situations. 
 
The Scottish government is responsible for setting long-term targets through 
its Energy Policy. It provides a framework for the authorities and is an 
important factor in guiding private sector interests. In The Climate Change Act 
2009, the Scottish government set an ambitious target for greenhouse gas 
emissions at reductions of 42% by 2020 and 80% by 2050. Scotland aims to 
drive technological development and place itself at the global forefront of 
providing a sustainable low carbon economy.  
 
The main sources of renewables in Scotland are hydropower and onshore 
wind farms, however, the Scottish government is implementing support 
schemes for the development of offshore wind farms, wave power, tidal 
stream and biomass, of which a growing level is situated in the north of 
Scotland. An important aspect of the challenge lies in connecting these 
generation facilities to the transmission network. The construction of the 
Beauly-Denny HVTL will increase the transmission capacity between the 
Highlands and central Scotland and was therefore deemed important for a 
successful Scottish Energy Policy (Scottish government, 2010). The Beauly-
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Denny line will enable the construction of an interconnection between 
Scotland and England – Scotland’s port to export green energy. 
 
In Scotland, applications to construct new or modify existing grids are made 
to the Scottish Ministers. The Energy Consents Unit (ECU) considers all 
projects relating to electricity generation facilities and overhead power-lines. 
Both cases for and against an application are considered before giving consent, 
although particularly sensitive projects are subject to public inquiry. The ECU 
received the applications from SHETL and SPT to construct the Beauly-Denny 
line in September 2005. One year later, the unit announced that the proposed 
upgrade would be subject to a public inquiry. Public consultations, 
environmental and technical statements, and evidence from nearly 200 
witnesses collected during the inquiry were considered when making their 
recommendation of consent. 
 
The Sector Regulator 
The GB regulator of the gas and electricity markets is Ofgem. The main priority 
of the regulator is to protect customers by promoting competition and 
regulating (natural) monopolies where competition is not an alternative. The 
focus lies in providing Britain with a secure energy supply and to contribute 
to limit the energy sector’s adverse environmental effects. Ofgem regulates the 
TOs through eight-year price control periods, which aim to incentivise 
innovation, efficiency and curb expenditure. The price controls set the 
maximum revenue TOs are allowed to generate through transmission levies20.  
 
Major network updates require significant investment from the TOs who seek 
approval from Ofgem to raise the capital through increased transmission 
charges. The TOs are pressured to minimise the expenditure of any project as 
Ofgem will only approve the costs that are clearly justifiable. However, despite 
claiming that the interests of the UK consumers are the main priority, Ofgem 
does not operate within a framework that allows for consumer participation 
 
20 Transmission levies form part of the end-users’ energy bill. 
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(Littlechild, 2012). Moreover, the formal rules within this framework may not 
have been created to be socially efficient (North, 1995). North suggests that 
institutional rules are designed to benefit those with the bargaining power to 
effect change. In the context of grid developments, the TOs, relative to 
communities, are the players with the bargaining power; they are rich in 
capital and resources and have all the experience in the planning and 
execution of grid development. 
 
Although the Beauly-Denny line is argued to be an important infrastructure 
development project to maintain competition and enable development of 
renewable energy, it is not officially considered a national necessity for 
promoting competition and protection of consumers and is thus outside the 
price control allowance. In 2004, Ofgem presented a mechanism designed to 
fund transmission projects specific to connecting renewable generation. The 
Transmission Investment for Renewable Generation mechanism (TIRG) is 
comprised by four projects, one of them is Beauly-Denny. The mechanism 
allows for an accelerated process to fund these projects and thus fast-tracking 
the connection of renewable energy sources to the national grid (Ofgem, 
2011). 
 
Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission Ltd (SHETL) and Scottish Power 
Transmission Ltd (SPT) 
Through their transmission licences, the TOs are responsible for providing a 
secure and reliable service to their customers. Part of this service is 
identifying, planning and designing new power-lines, which also require them 
to produce an environment report to show Ofgem and the ECU that their 
proposal is justified and that all possible alternatives have been considered. 
 
The incentives for efficiency in the private sector are more powerful relative 
to the public sector because of external competition. Private companies 
typically follow the objective of minimising short-term costs and maximising 
long-term profits. However, the TOs are natural monopolies and despite 
Ofgem’s regulation, following Dixit (2002), it seems realistic to suggest that 
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where there is a lack of competition, little attention is paid to consumer 
preferences. Therefore, on the surface it seems as though the TOs incentives 
for substantial public engagement are weak.  
 
SHETL maintains that the construction of the Beauly-Denny line is vital to the 
future of the Scottish transmission network. Further developments, including 
generation facilities and additional transmission lines, depend on successful 
and timely construction. As licence holders, SHETL are responsible for 
ensuring a secure and reliable supply of electricity at reasonable prices and 
they argue that their license could be in jeopardy if they do not deliver 
(Personal interview 1, 2012). Although the Beauly-Denny line is mainly 
covered by SHETL’s area of responsibility, SPT realises the importance of the 
project for future connections, many of which will occur in SPT’s area 
(Personal interview 2, 2012). Consequently, Ofgem has granted SHETL and 
SPT the right to recover the cost of the project from their customers through 
transmission levies. The nature of the industry makes investments in 
transmission lines relatively safe although there is a certain regulatory risk. 
These major investments, where the value is in the actual asset rather than its 
usage, will be at risk if the regulator decides to change the rules of the sector. 
 
Local communities 
Community involvement in the planning process is relatively limited. Although 
invited to comment on draft proposals, communications with local 
stakeholders are more educational than a two-way information exchange. The 
communities are characterised by a heterogeneous pattern and also belong to 
the public sector. They consist of many and diverse individuals and local firms 
with different preferences that can also change over time. Their targets and 
objections are therefore difficult to contract and customers may not be willing 
or able to adequately reflect the interests of present and future customers 
(Littlechild, 2012). 
 
The general consent among the communities was that not enough effort was 
directed towards identifying alternative solutions to the routing, such as sub-
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sea cables or not enough measures to mitigate adverse effects. It should be 
noted that community opposition to a grid project may be motivated by the 
type of proposed technical solution for example in the use of overhead lines 
instead of underground cables. Community groups, including Stirling before 
pylons (2010) and Pylon pressure (2010), argued for undergrounding as the 
only reasonable level to mitigate the impact on wildlife, environment, and limit 
the visual landscape. However, undergrounding is not the panacea to limit all 
objections. For example, a section of the Beauly-Denny line crosses over an old 
battlefield, restricting any construction at the site. 
 
Also, some communities felt unfairly treated as the new developments only 
inferred costs for them and the benefits are enjoyed somewhere else. They 
consider the transmission line as substantially reducing the quality of the 
environment they live in and thus a reduction in their quality of life. The long-
term objectives of the government to export electricity through a Scotland-
England connection intensify the resistance. Further concerns relate to a loss 
of tourism and therefore a loss of business. 
 
The potential direct benefits of transmission lines for the communities include 
local job creation and the increased demand of local goods and services 
throughout the construction phase. However, the construction of transmission 
lines is a highly specific task that requires skilled labour and therefore much 
of the construction was carried out by international teams specialised in lining 
and on site pylon construction. It is thus unclear to what extent local jobs were 
actually created. 
 
Third party interests 
At a general level, there is strong support for green technology but at local 
levels there has been frequent controversy and opposition in relation to the 
actual developments. This has become a phenomenon known as NIMBYism 
(‘Not In My Back Yard’). However, it is wrong to assume that proximity to the 
developments is the only factor determining opposition. Often there are 
objections in relation to developments being too costly; having potentially 
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damaging effects on wildlife and ecosystems; and having a visual burden on 
the landscape. Such third-party objections lead to stalling at the planning stage 
and reduce the speed of development. For example, non-governmental 
organisations often develop blanket policies in relation to infrastructural 
development. Therefore, even when they are not directly affected, their 
experience and resources can provide robust opposition to controversial 
developments. 
 
A number of NGOs and environmental preservation groups became involved 
in the Beauly-Denny project. Based on the economic case for the project and 
the possibilities for green energy, organisations such as Friends of the Earth 
Scotland (FoES) and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) were supportive of 
the new development. However, NGOs with interests in preserving wildlife, 
biodiversity and a scenic landscape were generally opposed to the 
construction of the new power-line. These NGOs were also more vocal and 
involved in the public inquiry. 
 
The NGOs challenge the necessity of the project to a greater extent relative to 
the communities. The John Muir Trust argued that the need for the new line 
was poorly justified and that the strategic case for the chosen route lacked 
backing. Rather than a new line, they wanted to see an update of current lines, 
such as the east coast line. The John Muir Trust maintains a general renewable 
energy developments policy, which is in favour of a greater focus on small-
scale, sensitively sited renewable energy schemes close to existing settlements 
rather than large scale wind and hydro plants which connect to the 
transmission network (JMT, 2011). Moreover, the Beauly-Denny Landscape 
Group21 took part in the public inquiry and produced a parliamentary briefing, 
arguing against the case. Part of their concern was related to the future effects 
of the transmission line, such as the upsurge of applications to develop wind 
farms along its path. 
 
21  The John Muir Trust joined the Association for the Protection of Rural Scotland, 
Mountaineering Council of Scotland, National Trust for Scotland, Ramblers Association 
Scotland and the Scottish Wild Land Group to form the Beauly-Denny Landscape group. 
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5.3.4 Public engagement in the planning of the Beauly-Denny project 
Statutory requirements oblige SHETL and SPT to advertise their applications 
in the local press and planning authorities must be notified: Along the Beauly-
Denny line these include Stirling Council, Perth and Kinross Council, the 
Highland Council and the Cairngorms National Park Authority. Further 
notifications were sent to Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) and the Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency (SEPA). Objections were received from 
Stirling Council, Perth and Kinross Council, the Highland Council and the 
Cairngorms National Park Authority and 17,250 others. A further 2,994 
objections were received after the Inquiry closed (Scottish government, 2011).  
 
Heterogeneous understanding among communities 
Communication with communities at an initial stage of the planning process is 
a way to introduce planned extensions and increase communities 
understanding and knowledge of projects. Public understanding of 
transmission networks and transmission owners are generally low, as 
identified by Devine-Wright et al. (2010), and as experienced by both SHETL 
and SPT in the Beauly-Denny project.  
 
The members of the SSE Community Liaison Team22 noticed great differences 
among the affected communities. The communities that were more familiar 
with electricity transmission and generation facilities, such as hydroelectric 
generation, were generally more understanding and sympathetic to the idea 
of the new powerline. These communities were more open as well as able to 
actively contribute to the planning process. This supports the findings of Soini 
et al. (2011) and Atkinson et al. (2006), which suggests that the negative 
attitudes towards overhead powerlines dissipates over time. It also highlights 
the importance of provision of information to increase public understanding 
of the projects. 
 
 
 
22 Following the identification of the need for a close working relationship between the TOs 
and the communities, SSE implemented the SSE Community Liaison Team in 2009. 
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Uneven playing field among stakeholders 
Apart from the advertisement in the local press, SHETL and SPT are only 
required to notify planning authorities of the affected communities in the 
public consultations. As such, the communities are communicated to rather 
than consulted. Without a formal forum to make their voices heard, 
communities organise themselves in local groups, hold community meetings, 
run blogs, sign petitions and write letters to decision-makers. Communities 
along the Beauly-Denny line invested a great amount of time and money in 
their attempt to affect the planning process. During the public inquiry, 
communities had the opportunity to present their statements. 
 
However, many community representatives found the process intimidating 
and extremely stressful. They were under the impression that the inquiry was 
simply something for show rather than a chance to reach agreement. The 
Beauly-Denny Landscape Group engaged both engineers and economists to 
prepare objections against the technical and economic cases; however, it was 
felt that these were not adequately taken into account (Personal interview 3, 
2012). The process is thus not allowing for public participation where the 
public and members of the planning unit can effectively consult and negotiate 
on a level playing field. This view is shared by a member of the ECU, who 
reports of the public inquiry as an inefficient practice where the bargaining 
power mainly sit with the project developers (Personal interview 4, 2012). 
Although local stakeholders are invited to give their views, there is uncertainty 
regarding how much the government and developers listen. This confirms the 
theoretical work by Coase (1960) and the findings of North (1994) outlines 
earlier that it is the party with the better bargaining power that will benefit 
most from such institutional rule like a public inquiry. 
 
Financial compensation to achieve increased acceptance 
The use of compensation methods in connection with major infrastructure 
projects are relatively common and are often related to loss revenue and land 
to those directly affected. These methods can take a number of different 
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forms. 23  In this context, some developers have presented innovative 
instruments such as offering corporate bonds by the Dutch grid company 
TenneT in Germany to those affected by the projects (GRID ICT, 2016). The 
pervious chapter explored the limitations of and the more delicate issues that 
tend to arise when, as in the case of grid development, compensation is also 
considered for those indirectly affected24.  
 
In the case of the Beauly-Denny project, communities with experience of 
generation facilities often expected some level of financial compensation 
(Personal interview 1, 2012). The question of compensation was also raised 
during the public inquiry and on community blogs where communities 
pointed towards successful cases of community benefits provided to host 
communities of wind farms in Denmark (Pylon pressure, 2010). Expressed 
disappointment over the fact that compensatory measures were not even 
considered for the Beauly-Denny project, and transmission lines more 
generally, was also noted. 
 
However, representatives from SPT argued that there was no revenue margin 
to absorb increased expenditures from community compensations. Since it is 
essentially the UK consumers that finance the project, making them pay for 
something that is not economically justifiable will not be approved in the 
Ofgem framework (Personal interview 1, 2012). As part of the consent, SHETL 
were ordered to pay compensation on two occasions to affected communities. 
These measures were mandatory and thus Ofgem approved the costs of the 
compensations to be raised through transmission levies. 
 
5.3.5 Discussion and policy implications 
In this chapter we have shown that an economic method based on New 
Institutional Economic Theory can contribute towards framing and resolving 
conflicts arising from large infrastructure projects such transmission grid 
 
23  See World Bank (2012) and RGI (2015) for a generic overview of the topic and 
compensation methods in infrastructure projects. 
24 Also published in Tobiasson and Jamasb (2016). 
 110 
developments. Settlement of such multi-party conflicts with divergent 
interests requires more than a simple transactional approach - for example, 
the use of financial compensations or similar payments. Instead, we adopted 
elements of a new institutional economics view of such conflicts. We were 
therefore able to place a better focus on the importance of the rules and norms 
of the wider planning and regulatory framework within which the 
stakeholders, including the local communities, interact and settle their 
disputes. 
 
Public participation in the Beauly-Denny project 
The study of the Beauly-Denny project supports the findings of previous 
studies where the public contribution is at a stage downstream in the decision-
making process and thus of little influence (see Littlechild, 2012; Cotton and 
Devine-Wright, 2010). The communities did not consider the public inquiry as 
a sufficient forum to argue their case and saw it as just a façade, simply an 
attempt to calm local opposition (Personal interview 3, 2012 and Personal 
interview 4, 2012). In order for public engagement to be effective, it has to 
enter the early stages of a project, at a stage upstream the decision-making 
process. SHETL realised the need for increased community engagement and 
created the Community Liaison Team. However, not until after the public 
inquiry had taken place and thus long after the main bulk of oppositions had 
been received. 
 
Engagement at the later stages of planning provides little scope for the 
potential to influence the outcome and leaves communities feeling ignored. 
Meanwhile, if introduced at the early stages, the integration of public 
engagement can improve the possibility of a successful and excelled 
implementation of projects (Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2010). Local 
involvement in the design and implementation of a project increases local 
understanding and support and may assist in accelerating planning and 
development (Herbertson et al., 2009).  
 
 111 
Furthermore Arrow (1974) notes that decision making, particularly for issues 
where no markets exist to determine a price, requires collective action. A 
number of cases are discussed in Littlechild (2012) where negotiated 
settlements have proven highly successful in the U.S. and Canadian regulated 
markets; agreements are reached faster more efficiently and at a greater social 
outcome. In the Beauly-Denny project, local communities reported feeling 
blindsided by the developers (Personal interview 3, 2012), however, 
communities with an established relationship to the developer or other energy 
infrastructure were less likely to feel this way (Personal interview 1, 2012). 
This confirms the theoretical work and findings of previous literature that an 
important aspect of relationships between communities, government and 
developers is the level of trust. If communities are taken seriously and listened 
to at the start of a project and throughout, the level of trust for developers 
increases. In turn, this increases the likelihood of successful communications 
and lowers the rise of conflicts. A higher level of trust between the 
stakeholders can redistribute bargaining power, facilitate negotiations and 
reduce transaction costs. This in turn is more likely to generate successful 
principal-agent relationships.  
 
The experience from the Beauly-Denny project has significantly changed the 
way SHETL view and approach new grid developments. A new transmission 
line linking Caithness and Moray will feature over 160km of underground and 
subsea cable. For this project the communities and stakeholders were involved 
from the starting stage. In the process, the subsea/undergrounding solution 
was identified and ultimately favoured over an overhead line. 
 
Specific knowledge as precondition for effective contribution 
Allowing communities to take a more active role in the planning process 
should be done if the benefits, for example, accelerated development, 
outweigh the costs such as potential financial increases from the negotiation 
process. Communities along the Beauly-Denny line felt as if their opinions 
were not taken seriously and felt left out, partly because they simply did not 
have the relevant information and knowledge about the planning process 
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(Personal interview 3, 2012). It has been recognised that consumers at a 
general level lack knowledge of the grid, which can limit their contribution in 
the planning process (Devine-Wright et al., 2010; Soini et al. 2011; Littlechild, 
2012). 
 
Knowledge and experience are two important aspects of grid development and 
planning, yet the consumers do not require more know-how than the 
responsible planning unit. It may therefore be a case for educating, perhaps 
not the whole communities, but their representatives as a community 
consultation group. More importantly though is that the future framework and 
process is transparent and that information is easily available to all 
stakeholders. The roles and tasks of stakeholders should be clearly stated 
before commencing new projects, an undertaking which may involve policy 
changes on a governmental level. This minimises information asymmetries 
and thus transaction costs. 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
Increased electricity generation from renewable sources is expected to play a 
key role in achieving climate change policy objectives. However, the current 
network infrastructure is not well suited for the purpose, requiring both 
expansion and modernisation to allow a connection of the new facilities to 
networks. Public opposition to transmission network developments arise due 
to conflicts of interests between stakeholders. The lack of information 
provision, transparency and communication cause uncertainty in local 
communities, which lead to financial, political and social strains and some 
projects ultimately being aborted (see Best Grid, 2015). This is an issue in the 
UK and across the EU. The conventional decision-making and planning 
procedures seem to have failed to incorporate the relevant stakeholders 
effectively, thus generating stakeholder conflicts and opposition from affected 
parties, including local communities. Providing a secure and reliable network, 
including connecting renewable sources to the grid, is important to ensure a 
sustainable green energy future. 
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This chapter has outlined the main issues faced by transmission developments 
and by applying economic thinking we have identified the potential and 
shortcomings of the planning process and stakeholder interactions. The case 
study of the Scottish Beauly-Denny project, conducted through both, first hand 
interviews and secondary information confirms the findings of the previous 
studies and showcase a representative modern transmission development. 
The communities along the transmission line felt ignored, excluded and 
disappointed of lacking communication from developers and government 
alike. Communities and involved NGOs’ wishes to have been informed of the 
planned project and consulted at an earlier stage, allowing them more time to 
process the available information, prepare their own statements and put 
forward own evidence.  
 
These testimonies illustrate the importance of increased community 
involvement at an early stage of the planning process. Public contribution is 
found to be at a stage downstream in the decision-making process and thus of 
little influence. However, if introduced at the early stages, the integration of 
public engagement can improve the possibility of a successful and excelled 
realisation of projects as local involvement in the design and implementation 
can increase local understanding and support. Moreover, trust between 
communities, developers and government is important for future negotiations 
and can be achieved through transparency and set guidelines for stakeholder 
engagement in the planning process. If communities are taken seriously and 
listened to at the start of a project and throughout, the level of trust for 
developers increases. In turn, this increases the likelihood of successful 
communications and lowers the rise of conflicts. 
 
Furthermore, we detected that the planning process of grid developments is 
highly specific and requires certain knowledge and experience. For 
communities to understand and effectively contribute, as a consequence, it 
could be reasonable to specifically educate representatives from the 
community forming a community consultation group. Transparency in the 
process is likely to increase trust between stakeholders, which would increase 
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the potential success of future consultations. In policy developments, 
governments must recognise the link between strong public engagement and 
public support and allow communities the possibility to influence planning 
and development.  
 
However, it is yet to be observed and explored how similar projects proceed 
and whether or not the same problems and difficulties occur. It is to be 
expected that from a larger number of case studies more general conclusions 
can be drawn. Moreover, the potential for financial compensation in 
transmission projects provides the basis for further research. Opposition 
groups vented their disappointment of the lack of compensation, comparing 
their situation to communities hosting wind farms, which are regularly 
compensated through benefit schemes. In principle and in theory, the 
redistribution of costs and benefits to reach socially desirable outcomes is a 
viable and seeming solution, yet its application in practice provides numerous 
obstacles. This has been discussed at length in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusions 
 
The electricity sector is undergoing a remarkable change, supporting the 
overall transition required to meet policy objectives of lower carbon emissions 
as well as a safe and secure supply of electricity in a cost-effective manner for 
consumers. Electricity networks are part of the infrastructure vital to a 
functioning modern economy. This thesis considers specific elements of 
ongoing developments related to electricity networks, namely the impact on 
the economic regulation of networks and the new role for consumer. Achieving 
environmental and climate change policy targets is reliant on electricity 
networks adapting to changes and embracing an increased role in the 
electricity supply chain. The need for sensitivity to social justice and the 
preferences of electricity end-consumers is relatively new to network owners 
but is becoming increasingly important. 
 
Chapter 2 uses qualitative analysis to present a critical comparison of input 
and output-based incentive regulation, using the GB electricity networks as an 
example, with particular focus on the treatment of consumers and consumer 
engagement. Consumer engagement is a relatively new concept to electricity 
networks but it is becoming increasingly important in order to keep up with 
the rapid changes. Regulatory changes are notoriously slow and can, given the 
high degree of regulation of networks, which includes revenue control, act as 
a barrier for networks to follow progress in the sector. This risks delaying the 
realisation of policy targets. Traditional regulatory regimes are generally 
focused on cost minimisation and efficiency improvements, leaving other 
objectives largely overlooked. With the new regulatory framework RIIO, GB 
regulator Ofgem introduced a wider set of objectives and outputs for network 
owners to deliver, including more targets for delivering timely connections, 
environmental impact, and customer engagement. Customers and 
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stakeholders acted as consultants in the development process, a common 
feature in output-based frameworks.  
 
We find that there are greater opportunities for constructive customer 
engagement within an output-based framework, given the wider range of 
deliverables affecting companies’ revenues. It can be argued that output-based 
regulation provides another dimension to traditional incentive regulation and 
may reduce the impact of information asymmetries between the regulator and 
the regulated companies given the increased reliance on customer 
engagement. 
 
With DNOs becoming active, rather than passive transporters of electricity, 
future work could consider to further investigate the blurring of the lines 
between distribution and transmission networks in terms of objectives. 
 
Chapter 3 applies an empirical analysis of economic regulation of electricity 
networks, highlighting the issue of information asymmetries between 
regulated firms and the regulator and how productivity and efficiency 
benchmarking can aid in determining efficient costs of network owners.  
 
Using Norwegian data on DNOs from 2007 to 2014 we estimate the impact of 
the type of ownership as well as electricity network-level vertical integration 
on technical inefficiency. We find that, relative to state owned networks in our 
sample, council owned networks appear to have a negative impact on cost 
inefficiency while privately owned do not show a significant effect. Conversely, 
network-level vertical integration appears to positively impact inefficiency. 
From a theoretical point of view this may come as a surprise given efficiency 
opportunities in sharing of resources and economies of scale. The result may 
therefore indicate, regulatory gaming by the companies, inefficient resource 
allocation and a need for the regulator to consider the measures in place to 
separate different level networks within the one owner. The regulator 
exposing and correcting unproductive practices will support the goal of 
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protecting consumers from unjust energy costs and plays an important role in 
a well-functioning energy market.  
 
Moreover, chapter 4 puts social justice, energy stakeholders and the high 
voltage transmission network in focus. The challenges discussed in chapter 1, 
particularly extensive build out of renewable generation, and aging assets, 
necessitate excessive upgrades and expansion of the network. However, many 
new transmission lines are facing opposition from the affected local 
communities on the grounds of their environmental, social and possible 
economic impacts. The conflicts cause delays and prolong planning, thus 
adding to the project costs and frustration among involved stakeholders.  
 
The chapter reviews previous approaches applied to resolve similar conflicts, 
drawing on learning from other major infrastructure developments and 
energy projects such as onshore wind. We discussed direct compensation and 
benefit sharing methods, as well as property rights approaches and how these 
measures can play a role in reducing community opposition to grid 
development. However, ultimately, we suggest a socio-economic approach to 
grid development that is based on the concepts of weak and strong 
sustainability and that the environment affected by grid developments, rather 
than the community per se, can be compensated within a sustainability 
approach. This can be in the form of collective negotiations between the 
communities and the developer with the consent of the regulator and policy 
makers. Providing a menu of options has the potential to reduce information 
asymmetry, by forcing actors to reveal information about their preferences, 
therefore improve efficiency. The chapter provides a conceptual framework 
that unlocks an area of potential empirical research. Future studies should 
examine the practical application and the process of operationalizing the 
sustainability approach 
 
Finally, chapter 5 provides an assessment of the challenges present in network 
development projects in a practical setting. The Beauly-Denny 400kV 
transmission project in Scotland is the subject of a case study. Electricity 
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consumer and customer engagement is relatively new for electricity networks; 
in the energy industry, it is traditionally the retail segment of the sector that is 
concerned with consumer engagement. However, the need for network 
expansions, increased awareness of the general public, and innovation in 
networks basic functions necessitates greater awareness of social aspects and 
impact.  
 
The Beauly-Denny project was a contentious transmission line project in 
Scotland that received over 20,000 objections. We find that the lack of 
information provision, transparency and communication cause uncertainty in 
local communities, which lead to financial, political and social strains. 
Particularly the communities along the transmission line felt ignored, 
excluded and disappointed of lacking communication from developers and 
government alike. The importance of increased community involvement at an 
early stage of the planning process is illustrated and public contribution is 
found to be at a stage downstream in the decision-making process, therefore 
of little influence. If introduced at the early stages, the integration of public 
engagement can improve the possibility of a successful and excelled 
realisation of projects as local involvement in the design and implementation 
can increase local understanding and support. Moreover, trust between 
communities, developers and government is important for future negotiations 
and can be achieved through transparency and set guidelines for stakeholder 
engagement in the planning process. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
The landscape along the Beauly-Denny route 
 
Beauly to Fort Augustus 
This 50km section is predominantly routed in unpopulated moorland and forests. 
Several rivers and valleys are crossed the current substations at Beauly, Fasnakyle 
and Fort August will all be redeveloped. 
 
Fort August to Tummel Bridge 
This 77km section crosses the Grampian Mountains, areas of remote moorland, 
coniferous forests and river valleys. The route will follow the A9 a new substation 
near Tummel Bridge will be constructed.  
 
Tummel Bridge to Braco 
This 63km section crosses moorland, rivers, valleys and the low-lying landscape near 
Crieff and Muthill. A new substation will be constructed near Braco, surrounded by 
forest and moorland. 
 
Braco to Denny 
This 30km section crosses the Allan Water and the A9 before crossing moorland and 
the Ochil Hills. The route will cross a flat valley of the River Fourth but will avoid the 
main settlements as this is the most populated section of the route. A new substation 
will be constructed to the north-east of Denny. 
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Appendix 2 
Timeline of the Beauly-Denny Project 
 
2002/2003: 
• Identification of the need for the power-line, planning design 
2004: 
January and June 
• SPT and SHETL publish documents and draft routs for public 
consultations and initial conversations with landowners. 
December 
• The community group Stirling Before Pylons is constituted 
2005: 
July 
• SPT and SHETL publish proposed route of the line 
September 
• SPT and SHETL submitted application to the Scottish Ministers under 
Section 37 or the Electricity Act 1989, to construct the line in their 
respective licensed areas.  
2006:  
April 
• Formal process of consolation concluded 
• Cairngorms National Park objects the proposed line 
• Falkirk Council objects the proposed line 
• The Highland Council raises the possibilities of health concerns and 
asks for further evidence. 
• Perth and Kinross council object the proposal 
• Stirling Council object the proposal 
• SEPA support the application provided that certain matters are 
satisfactorily addressed. 
• SNH supports the application yet requires further information of 
environmental impacts of certain sections of the route.  
August 
• Scottish ministers announce that the proposed upgrade will be 
referred to a public inquiry. 
September 
• Public Local Inquiry ordered 
2007: 
February  
• The Beauly-Denny Landscape Group is formed opposing the project 
• Public Inquiry commenced – Five local discussion sessions 
December 
• Public Inquiry ended 
2010: 
January 
• Scottish Ministers grants consent to the project 
 147 
• SPT consult with and meet stakeholders and community to inform the 
preparation of the Stirling Visual Impact Mitigation Scheme (SVIMS) 
Consultation Report. 
September 
• SPT publish the SVIMS Consultation Report and SVIMS Consultation 
Leaflet 
November 
• Pre-construction work begins 
• SPT undertake voluntary consultation with stakeholders and 
community on the SVIMS Consultation Report 
2011: 
February 
• SPT submit SVIMS 
August 
• SPT submit updated SVIMS and Stirling Council given 45 days to 
comment on SVIMS 
December 
• Final consents given by Scottish Ministers 
• Woodlands and access track constructed 
2012: 
February 
• First tower completed 
2015 
November 
• Delivery and first energy 
